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I. INTRODUCTION
In education, "rights talk" is ubiquitous.1  The idea of a
constitutional "right to education" gradually entered our common
parlance over the long history of the common school movement,
2
followed by litigation over school desegregation, 3  gender
discrimination,4 and disability discrimination,5 and has become
cemented there through the past few decades of state
constitutional school finance litigation. 6 Beginning with Brown v.
Board of Education7 and the few cases preceding it,8 we gradually
have come to understand that each person has the right not to be
excluded from public education or discriminated against within it.
Through state constitutional equality litigation, we expanded
these rights against exclusion, and in some states against
I Mary Ann Glendon coined this term as part of her seminal monograph on the
perversion of civil and political discourse through the overly casual rhetoric of rights. See
MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 14
(1991).
2 See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (discussing the common school
movement).
3 The most comprehensive history of the Brown v. Board of Education decision and the
cases immediately leading up to it and following it is Richard Kluger's. See generally
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976). More recent examinations of this
history give greater treatment to the early cases brought by Latino plaintiffs, which
arguably paved the way for the Brown decision, but were left out of the Brown Court's
opinion. See Juan F. Perea, Buscando Amdrica: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail
to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1422-23, 1469 (2004); Kristi L. Bowman, Note,
The New Face of School Desegregation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1751, 1752-53 (2001).
4 See, e.g., Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Separate but Equal Education in the Context of Gender,
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 785, 792-96 (2004-2005) (reviewing the history of constitutional
litigation over gender equality in schooling).
5 See, e.g., Edwin W. Martin et al., The Legislative and Litigation History of Special
Education, in 6 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 25 (1996).
6 See, e.g., R. Craig Wood, Constitutional Challenges to State Education Finance
Distribution Formulas: Moving from Equity to Adequacy, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 531
(2004) (examining the history of state constitutional school finance litigation).
7 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 637 (1950) (invalidating
segregation in a public institution of higher education in Oklahoma); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629, 629 (1950) (invalidating segregation in public law schools in Texas); Sipuel v. Bd.
of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 631 (1948) (invalidating the exclusion of a non-white student from
a public law school in Oklahoma); Mendez v. Westminster, 64 F. Supp. 544, 551 (S.D. Cal.
1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947) (en banc) (invalidating the race-based exclusion of
Mexican-American students from public schools in California).
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discrimination, to socioeconomic status. 9 And as the state-level
tide has turned in the direction of educational adequacy litigation
and has focused its attention directly on the education clauses in
state constitutions, 10 the rhetoric of education rights has taken
center stage."
A close look at the numerous cases presenting ostensible state
constitutional "education rights" claims, however, reveals a
mismatch between rhetoric and reality. In some education clause
cases, courts cite the fact that children have a "right to education"
under the state constitution merely as a basis for rejecting motions
to dismiss for non-justiciability-a conception of the right as a
means of acquiring "generalized grievance" standing and nothing
more. 12 In a few others, the existence of a "fundamental right to
education," modeled on federal equal protection jurisprudence 13
provides the basis for holding against the state on an educational
equality claim based on the equal protection or "uniformity"
provisions of the state constitution. 14 In all such cases, though,
both the evidence presented and the remedies the courts order
9 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I1), 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1976) (invalidating
California's school finance system for allowing and maintaining systemic inequalities based
on local property wealth as being in violation of the state constitution's equality provisions).
10 Each state in the United States has a provision in its constitution requiring, or at least
admonishing, the legislature to fund a system of public schools. See John Dayton & Anne
Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who's Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2356
n.13 (2004). For a detailed analysis of these provisions and the ways in which state
supreme courts have interpreted them, see generally Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions
and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 301 (2011).
11 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989)
(invalidating Kentucky's entire legislative scheme for education funding and governance
due to broad inadequacies, in violation of the state constitution's education provisions, and
holding that each child in Kentucky has a fundamental right to education); Serrano II, 557
P.2d at 951 (holding similarly as to California's public school financing system, but terming
education a "fundamental interest").
12 See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV.
701, 752 (2010).
13 In these states, courts adopt the test from San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), which asks whether a right is "explicit or implicit" in the Constitution to
determine whether the right is fundamental and therefore necessitates strict scrutiny in an
equal protection challenge. Unlike the Court in Rodriguez, which held that education is not
a right explicitly or implicitly provided for in the United States Constitution, these state
courts easily cite the state constitution's education clause and come to the opposite
conclusion. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing "lockstepping" in
educational equality cases under state constitutions).
14 See Bauries, supra note 10, at 302-03.
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focus on the state education system as a whole, rather than on any
individual student rights-holders.1 5 Thus, other than as a means
of surmounting threshold obstacles to relief, an individual right to
education under state constitutions is more rhetoric than reality.
16
Considering this fact, this Article makes two claims, one
descriptive and the other normative. The Article's central
descriptive claim is that individual rights to education have not
been realized under state constitutions because the currently
dominant structure of education reform litigation prevents such
realization. In state constitutional education clause claims, both
pleadings and adjudication generally focus on the equality or
adequacy of the system as a whole, rather than on any particular
student's educational resources or attainment. I7
Part II traces the roots of the currently dominant systemic
approach, and finds these roots in federal institutional reform
litigation.18 This systemic focus leads to a systemic, rather than
an individual, approach to remediation, which ultimately subverts
any individual interests or rights that might have given rise to the
claims in the first place. 19 The systemic approach also sets up
judicial-legislative conflicts over statewide policymaking that need
15 See infra notes 117-20, 136-39, 149-62 and accompanying text (discussing remedies in
education clause litigation).
16 See infra notes 127-32, 168-77 and accompanying text (discussing the devaluation of
education rights by virtue of failing to individually remediate education clause claims).
17 See infra notes 117-20, 136-39, 149-62 and accompanying text (discussing remedies in
education clause litigation).
18 Scholars use different, and interchangeable, terms to describe the species of litigation
that presents claims brought against public agencies or institutions alleging systemic
violations of individual constitutional rights, which are typically remedied through a court-
superintended reform (by injunction or consent decree) of the institution itself. See Susan
P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1357 n.1 (1991).
The most common interchangeable terms used to describe this litigation are "public law
litigation," e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1284, 1288-89 (1976); "structural reform litigation," e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979);
"institutional litigation," e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARv. L. REV. 465, 466 (1980); and
"institutional reform litigation," e.g., Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional
Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1994 (1999) (reviewing MALCOLM M.
FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE
COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998)). I find "institutional reform litigation" to be
the most descriptively accurate, so I employ it throughout this Article.
19 See Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 734-35 (2012)
(discussing the subversion of individual rights in systemic adjudication of educational
adequacy claims).
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not arise, and these inter-branch conflicts sometimes prevent
judicial review of education claims altogether. 20 State courts'
responses to these conflicts have made the systemic approach the
largest obstacle currently preventing state courts from recognizing
individual rights to adequate education under state constitutions.
Parts III and IV move from the descriptive to the normative,
arguing that an individual constitutional right to education, if it
exists, can and should be defined through individual enforcement.
The central normative claim is that, rather than attempting
enforcement through broad, systemic injunctions and declaratory
judgments-as state courts have in every case thus far-state
courts should individually adjudicate individual educational
adequacy claims. The theoretical and operational grounding for
such an individualized approach lies in common law
constitutionalism. A common law constitutionalist approach to the
right to education will allow courts to address claims of right
incrementally, developing the law carefully and gradually, rather
than in broad strokes, as courts develop the law today. Following
this argument, Part V addresses some important considerations
for courts beginning to employ the common law constitutionalist
approach, and Part VI builds from these considerations to make
the case that an individual-rights approach to enforcing education
obligations may do more to advance reform of state education
systems than the current systemic approaches, while also
minimizing inter-branch conflict in the states.
II. SYSTEMIC LITIGATION AND EDUCATION REFORM
This Part discusses the ways in which we have attempted to
define and enforce "education rights" thus far and shows that
these strategies have established a regrettable path dependence in
state court litigation over ostensible affirmative rights to
education. The path in question was blazed through the use of
institutional reform litigation in federal courts to secure racial
equality in education. When education reform litigation moved to
the state courts and began pressing the requirements imposed by
state constitutional education clauses, it remained on the systemic
institutional reform litigation path. Being on that path has caused
20 Id.
954 [Vol. 48:949
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courts to issue rulings that at best subvert, and at worst
completely ignore, potential individual rights to education.
A. EDUCATION RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
Although education has been part of the American
constitutional tradition since before the Founding, 21 the concept of
"education rights" or "the right to education" is of far more recent
vintage.22 The drafters and adopters of about half of the early
state constitutions chose to recognize education in some form as a
function of the state.23 But, as John Eastman has documented,
few chose to textually recognize any sort of entitlement to
education on behalf of individual students, and in the few states
with such provisions mandating the availability of schools to "all
children," the courts routinely declined to enforce the ostensible
entitlement.24
Today, each state constitution provides for some sort of
educational command-most often stated as the duty of the state
to provide for an education system-and each of these commands
has its roots in a history in which the public provision of education
has gradually been seen as individually vital.25 Beginning with
the famous "Old Deluder Satan Act" of the Massachusetts
Colony, 26 and culminating in the ratification of an "education
21 See John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil Right?: An Assessment of
State Constitutional Provisions for Education 1776-1900, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 3 n.12
(1998) (naming Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Georgia, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire as states whose constitutions contained education provisions prior to 1787).
22 See id. at 33-34 (concluding there was no clear individual right to education at the end
of the nineteenth century).
23 See id. at 3 (stating that five of the thirteen original state constitutions mentioned
education).
24 Id. at 33. John Dinan's work on the intentions of state constitutional drafters provides
some support for Eastman's textual and historical conclusions as well. See John Dinan, The
Meaning of State Constitutional Education Clauses: Evidence from the Constitutional
Convention Debates, 70 ALB. L. REV. 927, 978-81 (2007) (concluding that the state
convention debates surrounding the enactments of state education clauses indicate that
these clauses were not intended to create judicially enforceable rights).
25 See Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting "Adequacy" In State Constitutions'
Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241 (2003) (discussing the effects of state
constitutions' education clauses on the duties of state governments to provide "adequate"
education for all children).
26 The Old Deluder Act, 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Boston, William Whitel853) (1647) ("It being
one cheife piect of ye ould deluder, Satan, to keepe men from the knowledge of ye
Scriptures, as in formr times by keeping ym in an unknowne tongue, so in these lattr times
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clause" in the constitution of every U.S. state,27 we have
recognized education's importance to the individual's well-being,
first as a spiritual matter and then gradually as a political and
citizenship matter.
Often called the "Father of the Common School," Horace Mann
famously made the following argument in his Tenth Annual
Report in 1845 as Secretary of Education for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts:
I believe in the existence of a great, immortal,
immutable principle of natural law, or natural
ethics,-a principle antecedent to all human
institutions, and incapable of being abrogated by any
ordinance of man,-a principle of divine origin, clearly
legible in the ways of Providence as those ways are
manifested in the order of Nature and in the history of
the race, which proves the absolute right to an
education of every human being that comes into the
world; and which, of course, proves the correlative
duty of every government to see that the means of that
education are provided for all.28
Mann also said, in the same Report:
by pswading from ye use of tongues, yt so at least ye true sence & meaning of ye originall
might be clouded and by false glosses of saint seeming deceivers, yt learning may not be
buried in ye grave of or ffathrs in ye church and comonwealth, the Lord assisting or
endeavors., - It is therefore ordred, yt evry towneship in this iurisdiction, aftr ye Lord hath
increased ym to ye number of 50 householdrs, then shall forthwth appoint one wthin their
towne to teach all such children as shall resort to him to write & reade, whose wages shall
be paid eithr by ye parents or mastrs of such children, or by ye inhabitants in genrall, by
way of supply, as ye maior st of those yt ordr ye prudentials of ye towne shall appoint;
prvided, those yt send their children be not oppressed by paying much more yn they can
have ym taught for in othr towns; & it is furthr ordered, yt where any towne shall increase
to ye numbr of 100 families or householdrs, they shall set up a gramar schoole, ye mr
thereof being able to instruct youth so farr as they may be fited for ye university, prvided, yt
if any towne neglect ye prformance hereof above one yeare, yt every such towne shall pay 5
pounds to ye next schoole till they shall prforme this order.").
27 For a listing of the fifty state constitutional education clauses, see R. CRAIG WOOD,
EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS-AN
ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 103-08 (3d ed. 2007).
28 HORACE MANN, Report for 1846-The Common School System of Massachusetts, in 4
LIFE AND WORKS OF HORACE MANN 115-16 (Boston, Lee & Shepard Publishers 1891).
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The will of God, as conspicuously manifested in the
order of Nature, and in the relations which he has
established among men, founds the right of every child
that is born into the world, to such a degree of
education as will enable him, and, as far as possible,
will predispose him, to perform all domestic, social,
civil, and moral duties, upon the same clear ground of
natural law and equity as it founds a child's right,
upon his first coming into the world, to distend his
lungs with a portion of the common air, or to open his
eyes to the common light, or to receive that shelter,
protection, and nourishment, which are necessary to
the continuance of his bodily existence. 29
Mann, then, viewed education as a natural, inherent, and
inalienable right-a right in the natural-law sense of the
Declaration of Independence, bestowed by one's Creator and not
subject to abrogation.
Mann's ideas about schooling, its availability, its funding, and
its management and structure were among the most influential in
history, but his conception of the right to education did not
textually catch on in nineteenth century state constitutions, or in
the courts of that era. Throughout that era, legislatures were
given broad discretion to provide for schools, or not provide for
them, and where individual students brought claims asserting
rights or entitlements to education, these claims were routinely
rebuked in the courts.30 Recognizing something that we might
term a "right to education," in the sense of a legal entitlement to
free educational services from the government, would require an
evolution in legal practice. That evolution came with the "rights
revolution of the Twentieth Century"31 and the advent of
institutional reform litigation.32
29 See id. at 334.
30 See Eastman, supra note 21, at 33 ("The development of a right to education was in a
sense frozen in time by this switch to equal protection analysis, and for more than a century
now courts have quibbled over whether a particular kind of education ... is truly equal to
that provided others.").
31 See generally MARK TUSHNET, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(2009); see also Eastman, supra note 21, at 1-2 (detailing other landmark cases in the wake
of Brown that struck down segregation in non-education contexts).
32 See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979)
(pegging the beginning of institutional reform litigation as the moment that Brown was
2014] 957
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There are several varieties of what might be termed "reform
litigation." The most basic, and least controversial, form generally
involves private law claims, typically brought as class or other
aggregate actions, seeking to alter or stop dangerous or risky
business behavior that creates negative externalities-for
example, litigation over dangerous pharmaceuticals.33 A primary
motivation for filing such litigation is, of course, to obtain
compensation for the victims of dangerously designed products,
but another important reason that such cases are brought is to
cause changes in the ways that products are designed and
marketed. 34
Another variety is focused on securing a general change in legal
standards, usually through invalidating some positive law that is
thought to infringe negative rights broadly-the recent D.C.
handgun ban case, for example. 35 This form of litigation does not
require much in the way of remediation. 36 Typically, a declaration
that the targeted law is unconstitutional, or at most, an injunction
against its enforcement, suffices to remedy the harm. Still another
variety involves the enforcement of federal (and sometimes state)
statutes enacted to protect individual rights against
maltreatment-a Title VII class action lawsuit, for example.37
This form seeks to reform private or public institutional behavior
similarly to the first form identified here-by seeking a damage
decided).
33 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal
Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 977-98 (1993-1994)
(discussing mass tort litigation challenging the manufacture and sale of dangerous
pharmaceutical products).
34 See R. Daynard, Why Tobacco Litigation?, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 1, 1-2 (2003)
(outlining the public benefits both sought and achieved through mass tobacco litigation); cf.
Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection
of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 75-82 (criticizing some
forms of this litigation as anti-democratic).
35 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
36 See, e.g., id. (granting a limited remedy by declaring the law at issue unconstitutional
and instructing the district court to grant Heller permission to carry a handgun and the
issuance of a license to carry the handgun in his home, so long as Heller is not disqualified
from the exercise of Second Amendment rights).
37 E.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (presenting a class action aimed
at voiding the rejection of an employment promotion test, on the grounds that the rejection
of the test was racially motivated).
958 [Vol. 48:949
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award or injunction against a particular harm and trusting that
such remedies will deter future illegal conduct and future harms.38
The most controversial variety of reform litigation has been
variously termed "public law litigation," "structural reform
litigation," "institutional litigation," and "institutional reform
litigation."3 9 This litigation typically begins with a claim brought
on behalf of a representative individual or a group of similarly
situated individuals-for example minority students, inmates at a
particular prison, or patients at a particular hospital.40 The claim
is typically grounded on the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, specifically the Equal Protection Clause (in
the case of segregated school systems) or the Due Process Clause
(in the case of prisons and hospitals). 41 The claim is also brought
against an institutional defendant, which denotes a defendant that
is a government institution, such as a school district, prison, or
hospital, rather than a person or private corporation. 42 Most
importantly, the remedy sought is an institutional one-rather
than compensation to a particular harmed plaintiff, the suit seeks
38 A significant subset of this form involves suits explicitly brought on behalf of the
federal government to assert the government's own interests in punishing lawbreakers.
Referred to as "qui tam actions," these suits are thought of as "deputizing" one or a number
of "private attorneys general" and incentivizing these plaintiffs (usually through a bounty
payable as a percentage of the government's recovery) to bring lawsuits challenging the
unlawful actions of business entities in business with the government. For a review of the
law surrounding such actions, see Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui
Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989).
39 See Sturm, supra note 18, at 1355, 1357 n.1 ("public law litigation"); Chayes, supra
note 18, at 1284, 1288-89 (same); Fiss, supra note 32, at 2 ("structural reform"); Eisenberg
& Yeazell, supra note 18, at 466 ("institutional litigation"); Schlanger, supra note 18, at
1995 ("institutional reform litigation"). I favor and use "institutional. reform litigation"
because it is the most descriptively accurate, for reasons I explain in later sections of this
Article. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
40 See Chayes, supra note 18, at 1310 (noting that in this type of litigation the claims are
typically based on similarly situated interests, "whether organized or unorganized").
41 See, e.g., Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 225 (1964) (holding that the school
board denied the petitioners equal protection under the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) ("Eighth Amendment
scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions .... Where the State seeks to impose
punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
42 A. David Reynolds, The Mechanics ofInstitutional Reform Litigation, 8 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 695, 695 (1979-1980).
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a restructuring of the institution itself to end an ongoing harm, as
well as to eliminate the vestiges of prior harms.43
As Abram Chayes pointed out long ago, the judge in such
litigation does not so much adjudicate the claim as manage it.44
Rarely do institutional reform claims reach a verdict on the merits.
Rather, they most typically result in a negotiated settlement
agreement, which the court formalizes into a consent decree, a
device that effectively orders performance of the settlement
agreement, thus converting any breach of the agreement into a
potential contempt of court.45  Often, rather than directly
monitoring the compliance with a consent decree, the court
appoints a special master to serve this function.46
Where institutional reform litigation does reach a judicial
verdict for the plaintiffs, the result is much the same. But instead
of a consent decree, the court issues a structural injunctive order
against the institutional defendant requiring the cessation-and
often the prospective elimination of the vestiges-of the identified
constitutional harm, and the judge either assumes monitoring of
the compliance with the injunction directly or appoints a special
master to handle the monitoring on the ground, as is true in the
consent decree situation.47 Thus, although it involves traditional
remedies such as damages and negative injunctions, institutional
reform litigation takes the additional step, as it must, of using the
mandatory structural injunction or its contractual equivalent, the
consent decree, often placing courts in direct or indirect control of
public institutions for years or even decades. 48
43 See id. at 697 (introducing the problem of remediation in institutional reform cases).
44 See Chayes, supra note 18, at 1300-01 (describing the processes involved in fashioning
institutional reform remedies).
45 Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN
COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 6-7 (2003); Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in
Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1020 (1986); Chayes, supra note 18,
at 1298-1302; see also Reynolds, supra note 42, at 697 ("When the relief comes in the form
of a consent decree, reached through negotiations between the court and all interested
groups, as it often does, there is a further assurance that an appropriate balance has been
struck between the competing interests.").
46 Chayes, supra note 18, at 1300-01.
47 Sturm, supra note 18, at 1357 (describing remedies in public law litigation and the
courts' role in their implementation).
48 Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, The Supreme Court, Democracy and Institutional
Reform Litigation, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 915, 916 (2005) (describing the development of
the use of injunctions and consent decrees in public law litigation); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV.
[Vol. 48:949960
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Since the posthumous publication of Lon Fuller's
comprehensive project aimed at defining adjudicatory forms and
their limits 49 during a time that most would view as the apex of
institutional reform litigation, 50 numerous scholars have offered
both challenges to and defenses of institutional reform litigation as
a legitimate adjudicatory form.5 1  Fuller's article focused
significant attention on the idea that courts are ill-equipped to
solve what Fuller termed "polycentric problems." Polycentric
problems are problems that cannot be solved themselves without
also solving, or at least taking into account, multiple interrelated
problems at the same time. As an illustration, Fuller offered a
spider web-if one touches one strand of a spider's web, the action
reverberates throughout the web, causing unpredictable effects
that would initially seem unrelated to the action from the
L. REV. 1016 (2004) (reviewing the history of institutional reform litigation). To be sure, the
idea of institutional reform litigation is not without its critics, see, e.g., id. at 1018 (citing
SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 45, at 139-82; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 11 (1991); Donald L. Horowitz,
Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 1265; Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 46 (1979)), and its defenders, see, e.g., id.
(citing William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 636 (1982); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance,
92 YALE L.J. 585, 589, 674-79 (1983)). Nevertheless, there is no doubt that these cases
have indeed been heard and decided in the federal courts, and they are repeatedly cited in
support of the courts' institutional competence to engage in ongoing supervision of
legislative policymaking.
49 See generally Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978). Fuller wrote and refined the bulk of the essay in the 1950s and 1960s, and he
published portions of it in several outlets during the 1960s and 1970s, but the full argument
was not published until after his death. See id.
50 See, e.g., Robert Roberts, The Rise and Fall of the Public Law Litigation Model:
Implications for Public Management, 13 PUB. ADMIN. & MGMT. 51, 56 (2008) (tracking the
history of institutional reform litigation, explaining the many developments, particularly in
the 1970s, that caused the form to expand, and explaining the decline of the form beginning
in the 1980s).
61 As others have pointed out, this body of scholarship began with the work of Abram
Chayes and Owen Fiss and soon expanded greatly. See Susan Poser, What's a Judge to Do?
Remedying the Remedy in Institutional Reform Litigation, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1307, 1307
(2004) (reviewing SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 45); Schlanger, supra note 18, at
1994 (reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998)). For
representative sample of important and impactful scholarly work both challenging and
defending the institutional reform litigation form, see DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND
SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Fletcher, supra note 48, at 635; Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges,
96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 18, at 465; Fiss, supra note
32, at 1-2; Chayes, supra note 18, at 1281.
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perspective of one who can only see the strand acted upon.52 Also,
doubling the pressure on the strand does not necessarily double
the reactions throughout the web-such reactions are difficult to
assess unless one can take stock of the entire web at once.
Fuller took as his starting point in defining the forms of
adjudication the manner in which the individual participates in an
adjudicatory decision. Fuller contended that, for a decisionmaking
process to be properly called adjudication, it must allow for the
participation of interested parties in the decision through
"presenting proofs and reasoned arguments," and such
participation must imply a demand on the arbiter of a certain
principled rationality in coming to a decision. 53 Fuller contended
that the resulting expectation of principled rationality in
adjudicatory decisionmaking constrains courts from being able to
make political decisions, which inherently are held to a lower
standard. 54 This requirement of rationality and principle also
affects the controversies brought in front of judges for resolution,
in that all disagreements submitted to judges tend to be converted
into claims of right of one form or another. 55
From this foundation, Fuller proceeded to opine as to which
problems are suitable for adjudication and which lie beyond
adjudication's useful limits. Fuller argued that polycentric
problems are particularly unsuited for adjudication because of the
way that participants in adjudication, the parties and their
counsel, must engage the adjudicatory process-through reasoned
arguments and proofs in support of claims of right.56 These
52 Since Fuller's time, chaos theorists have expanded upon this idea, developing a rich
theoretical, mathematical, and even popular literature explaining the behavior of chaotic
systems, which, like Fuller's spider web, act in unpredictable ways due to their sensitivity
to "initial conditions"-their characteristics prior to the application of stimuli. Popular
culture has come to associate chaos and polycentricity with the "butterfly effect"-the claim
that a rainstorm in China, for instance, may have as one of its causes a butterfly flapping
its wings in Brazil. This popular understanding is not an accurate depiction of the
sophisticated chaotic models that mathematical theorists have produced, but it shares
elements with Fuller's idea of polycentricity.
63 Fuller, supra note 49, at 364. As Fuller argued, it would make no sense to require the
presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments to a decisionmaker who is incapable of or
indisposed to reasoned and rational decisionmaking based on such proofs and arguments.
Id.
5 Id. at 367.
55 Id. at 369.
6 See id. at 398 (describing the limitations of the adjudicatory system in resolving
polycentric problems).
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conventions make it unlikely that the parties will adequately bring
before the court the multi-faceted features of a polycentric social
problem, and as a result, the court's decision is likely to have
unpredictable effects, likely leading to a failure of the remedy. 57
Where the court becomes aware that the problem it confronts is
polycentric, Fuller predicted, either the court will allow the
adjudicatory process's rationality and principle to become
corrupted through the consideration of non-evidentiary facts,
hunches, politically motivated opinions, and remedial experiments;
or instead of reforming the process to fit the problem, the court
will reform the problem to fit the process-thus converting a
political problem of resource allocation, for example, into
competing legal claims of right.58
Around the time that Fuller's full argument was published,
Abram Chayes published his seminal work defining and defending
institutional reform litigation. 59  Chayes provided the first
substantial defense against what he saw as the main challenge to
institutional reform litigation-the lack of democratic
accountability inherent in the structural injunction and consent
decree process. Chayes recognized that the process of settlement
and remediation of public law harms was undemocratic, but
ultimately judged that this reality, though unpleasant, was an
acceptable tradeoff for institutional reform litigation's potential to
address political failures.60
Since then, commentators have at times echoed and extended
the prescient theoretical critiques of Fuller, and have at other
times marshaled empirical data to make the case that institutional
reform litigation does not accomplish the reform it hopes to
accomplish. One of the earliest critics of institutional reform
litigation, William Fletcher, precipitated later critiques and
provided the theoretical grounding for more empirical analyses to
come.6 1  Fletcher recognized that all large-scale institutional
reform litigation, to be successful, must ultimately charge the
judiciary with either directing or approving the making of
57 Id. at 401.
58 Id.
59 Chayes, supra note 18, at 1281. Although Chayes used the term "public law litigation,"
this term is interchangeable with the term "institutional reform litigation," along with
several other terms. See supra note 18.
60 Chayes, supra note 18, at 1312-13.
61 Fletcher, supra note 48, at 635-36.
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judicially favored public policy. Fletcher saw this inevitability as
dangerous to judicial legitimacy and contended that judicial
remedial discretion to direct the making of public policy must be
viewed as presumptively illegitimate. 62
Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod, in their 2004 book,
Democracy by Decree,63 took on the Chayesian defense of
institutional reform litigation on its own terms and with the
benefit of hindsight. The authors provided empirical evidence of
the tendency of institutional reform litigation to involve courts, or
in the consent decree situation, parties, in the making of positive
social policy. Sandler and Schoenbrod showed that, as a result of
the settlement of an institutional reform case through the common
device of the consent decree, a court in effect sets up a "controlling
group" composed of lawyers for both sides of the dispute, joined by
other advocates and public officials, and that this group, rather
than elected officials, effectively becomes the entity that makes
policy.
The authors argued that this process is the antithesis of
democratic accountability, chiefly because a typical consent decree
(1) requires more than would have been required under the law
violated and (2) allows a current control group to bind future
lawmakers to an agreement to do more than the law requires. 64
Considering the fact that consent decrees and structural
injunctions, owing to their remedial purposes, both often require
more of defendants than the positive constitutional or statutory
law require, and that both are difficult to modify, the authors
concluded that the institutional reform litigation form subverts the
democratic process, even (or especially) where the government
entity in question rapidly comes into compliance with minimum
legal requirements but remains under the decree afterwards.
Where Sandler and Schoenbrod focused on the observable
effects of institutional reform litigation on democratic processes,
Gerald Rosenberg's critique of the form was based on an
examination of its effectiveness at achieving the stated goal of the
institutional litigation form-reform of social systems and public
62 Id. at 637 (drawing on Fuller's concept of polycentricity).
63 SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 45.
6 See id. at 167-74 (describing fundamental issues in using consent decrees in cases
involving government and government officials).
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policy.65 Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope challenged the
assumptions underlying the institutional reform litigation
movement, and other court-centric approaches to political reform,
by showing that where courts succeed in causing fundamental
social change they generally do so only with the cooperation of the
political branches. 66 Where such cooperation does not exist, courts
can succeed if they are supported by ongoing social movements,
but where neither of these conditions is present, courts are
constrained by their role (and that role's corresponding lack of
"hard power"67) from causing social change.68
These critiques have generated useful responses. 69  In
particular, the model of "destabilization rights" recently
articulated and defended in two papers presents a novel and
updated defense of the institutional litigation form.70 This defense
assumes the perpetuity of the remedial phase. Where the
remedial phase is assumed to be perpetual rather than time-
limited, the authors claim, it is proper to expect that the process
will become a new means of policymaking, involving interested
stakeholders in ongoing experimentation and correction where
unforeseen problems arise-arguably addressing Fuller's
challenge to the polycentricity of the problems.7 1 However, rather
65 ROSENBERG, supra note 48, at 5.
66 Id. at 336.
67 See, e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu, Judicial Review as Soft Power: How the Courts Can Help
Us Win the Post-9/11 Conflict, 1 AM. U. NAT'L SEC. L. BRIEF 69, 73 (2011) (distinguishing
"between 'hard power,' which generally constitutes the ability to attain favorable foreign
policy outcomes by way of military force or economic coercion, and 'soft power,' defined as
the ability to achieve those outcomes by way of attraction," and then arguing that judicial
power is "soft power").
6 See ROSENBERG, supra note 48, at 336-38 (describing the judiciary's success in causing
social change in both circumstances).
69 Although generally confirming Rosenberg's claims against institutional reform
litigation resulting in judicial management of "the economic and administrative powers of
the state," Matthew E.K. Hall's work calls into question Rosenberg's broader conclusion
that the courts are generally ineffectual at causing reform without the assistance of the
political branches or social movements. See MATTHEW E.K. HALL, THE NATURE OF SUPREME
COURT POWER 164 (2011). Specifically, Hall establishes that, where the Supreme Court
limits its role to recognizing rights that the lower courts can implement, the Court has been
very successful at enabling reform without political assistance. See id. at 163.
70 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 48; James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public
Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal
Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183 (2003); William S. Koski, The Evolving Role
of the Courts in School Reform Twenty Years After Rose, 98 KY. L.J. 789 (2000) (outlining a
cooperative systemic approach to reform).
71 Sabel & Simon, supra note 48, at 1057.
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than focusing on experimentation with remedial orders, this model
focuses on remedial orders that themselves call for
experimentation, drawing upon what the authors term "new
publics"-interested stakeholders who extend far beyond the
attorney-led party groups criticized as "control groups" into the
communities in which reform must occur.72
These critiques and responses are, of course, relevant to all
institutional reform litigation, and they should be part of any
discussion over expanding the form to new arenas of public policy.
These scholarly treatments, however, are particularly relevant to
the expansion of the institutional litigation form from federal to
state courts-an expansion that largely happened in the policy
arena of education.
As Owen Fiss pointed out years ago,73 federal education rights
litigation is the quintessential form of institutional reform
litigation. The movement for reform through large-scale systemic
claims seeking institutional remedies had its genesis in the
seminal education rights case Brown v. Board of Education.74
Brown itself did not arise as a class action, and neither the Brown
decision nor its follow-on, generally referred to as "Brown II,"
resulted in remedial orders that Fuller, Chayes, Fiss, or any other
observer of institutional reform litigation would view as
institutional or structural remedies. Rather, the initial Brown
case merely resulted in a declaration that segregation violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, 75 while Brown II merely admonished
states to desegregate their schools "with all deliberate speed."76
Neither case resulted in the kind of ongoing judicial management
that would later come to characterize institutional reform
litigation. However, legislative resistance to both decisions led
directly to cases such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of
Education,77 which exemplifies the institutional reform litigation
paradigm.
72 Id. at 1022-28.
73 Fiss, supra note 32, at 2; see also Liebman & Sabel, supra note 70.
74 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75 See id. at 495 ("Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we
hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
76 Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
77 402 U.S. 1 (1970). This was the first case in which the Supreme Court approved a
district-wide school busing remedy.
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Though there were some dissenters, and though even some
supporters expressed misgivings, by the late 1960s and early
1970s, a rough consensus had developed that institutional reform
litigation was a useful and effective tool available to reformers
seeking to alter a constitutionally unacceptable status quo relating
to the delivery of public services. Thus, it is completely
understandable that, when litigation over education rights shifted
its focus from racial equality to socioeconomic equality in the early
1970s, reformist attorneys strategically selected the institutional
reform litigation model as the way to organize their suits.
B. EQUILIBRATION AND DEVOLUTION
In his scholarship of constitutional adjudication, Daryl
Levinson has developed the influential idea of "remedial
equilibration." 8  The idea is that, as courts engage in the
adjudication of rights claims, a process develops by which the
remedies that the courts order, over time, come to constitute the
practical content of the rights enforced. This process at times
gives a right more content than its text would readily denote and
at times less content than it would seem the text demands. The
direction often depends on the court's perception of its own
institutional capital.7 9
As an example, Levinson describes the desegregation era of
institutional reform litigation, where the Brown Court ordered no
action on the part of state legislatures or school districts, but
merely declared that de jure segregation was illegal.80  This
decision was followed closely by Brown II, in which the Court went
one step further and ordered the lower courts in the Brown cases
to issue orders that the plaintiff students be admitted to the white-
enrolled schools "with all deliberate speed."81 This latter remedy
was directed squarely at remedying de jure segregation and led to
an early understanding that the Equal Protection Clause provided
no protection against de facto school segregation, such as that
78 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857 (1999).
79 Id. at 876-78 (describing the desegregation era of institutional reform litigation).
80 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
81 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
9672014]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
which might result from the combination of historical housing
patterns with residential school zoning.8 2
But the Brown rulings were not followed locally. In fact, they
were widely flouted. This recalcitrance led directly to judgments
and remedies requiring school districts to fully integrate their
school systems.8 3 As Levinson points out, during this period it was
unclear at best whether the equal protection right was really only
a right against de jure segregation, or was rather a right to an
integrated school system as a matter of fact.8 4 Looking at the
remedies, which often included the forced busing of students from
one part of a district to another to achieve racial balance in district
schools,85 one would be at pains to conclude that the right to equal
protection protected only against dejure segregation. This was the
phenomenon of remedial equilibration at work-the remedies
ordered in institutional reform cases challenging segregation
effectively altered the scope of the right to equal protection to
prohibit de facto segregation, or even to require school integration.
In time, political pressures and membership changes caused the
Court to draw back on the use of broad consent decrees and
structural injunctions. This began with Milliken v. Bradley,8 6 in
which the Court prevented Detroit's structural injunction from
reaching surrounding suburban school districts that could not be
shown to have racially discriminated themselves.8 7  And it
culminated twenty years later with Missouri v. Jenkins,88 in which
the Court rejected a structural injunction directed at making the
Kansas City School District more attractive as a "magnet" for
suburban students outside the district.8 9 In Jenkins, the Court
held that remedies must be directed only at removing the vestiges
of prior de jure segregation and restoring control to the district's
board. 90 The Court then remanded the case to the district court for
a determination of whether "partial unitary status" had been
82 See generally Paul Auster, De-Facto Segregation, 6 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41 (1965).
8 Levinson, supra note 78, at 877-78.
84 Id. at 876-78.
8 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970).
- 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
87 Id. at 757.
- 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
89 See id. at 94 (finding that the district court had acted "beyond the scope of its broad
remedial power").
90 See id. at 101-03 (detailing the proper standard to be used in such cases).
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achieved. 91 This decision set off a wave of unitary status relief-
from-judgment motions, and many structural injunctions and
consent decrees ended. 92 Thus, the right to equal protection,
through remedial equilibration, once again became a right to be
free from de jure segregation-nothing more.
The Milliken decision coincided with another front in the equal
protection wars. On this front, plaintiffs attempted to extend the
reasoning of Brown and the other pre-Milliken cases from race to
socio-economic status. The test case was San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,93 a case which presented the claims of
students from the Edgewood School District in the San Antonio
area, who argued that very large disparities in funding between
their own school district and the neighboring Alamo Heights
School District-with greater property wealth-constituted a
violation of their rights to equal protection. 94
Success for the Rodriguez plaintiffs depended on their
convincing the Court to hold either that education was a
fundamental right under the United States Constitution, or that
wealth was a suspect classification. Either of these holdings would
have meant that strict scrutiny would have been applied to the
disparities in funding, and Texas would likely have lost on that
test.95 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Court rejected both
theories, applied rational basis review, and upheld the Texas
school funding system based on the asserted state interest in
preserving local control of educational decisionmaking.
The Court's stated concerns in rejecting the extension of strict
scrutiny to education or wealth clearly illustrate how the content
of a right becomes bound up with concerns over its remediation:
Thus, we stand on familiar ground when we continue
to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack
both the expertise and the familiarity with local
91 See id. at 101 (declaring that the state's goal is to achieve "partial unitary status as to
the quality educational programs").
92 See generally Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination
of Unitary Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1105, 1105-09 (1990).
93 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
94 See generally Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
and Its Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963 (2008).
95 Id. at 1970.
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problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions
with respect to the raising and disposition of public
revenues. Yet, we are urged to direct the States either
to alter drastically the present system or to throw out
the property tax altogether in favor of some other form
of taxation. No scheme of taxation, whether the tax is
imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods
and services, has yet been devised which is free of all
discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in
which no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well
not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest
all local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism
under the Equal Protection Clause.96
In the case of Rodriguez, such remedial concerns effectively
removed both education and wealth from the scrutiny of the Equal
Protection Clause, effectively converting Brown from an "education
rights" decision to a decision about racial equality that only
happened to arise out of the public schooling context.
The Rodriguez decision, however, did not foreclose litigation on
the right to adequate education, or even the right to equal
educational opportunity. Rather, the Rodriguez Court's holdings
that education was not a federal fundamental right, and that
wealth would not be considered a suspect classification for federal
equal protection purposes, effectively moved this litigation into
state courts under state constitutions.97 State constitutionalists
would place these new state cases into the tradition of the "New
Judicial Federalism," an independent state constitutionalism
exemplified by judicial interpretations of state documents that
diverge from federal interpretations of similar provisions in the
federal document.98
From this early time, state constitutional education reform
litigation has typically been framed and approached as a state-
based form of the federal institutional reform litigation that led to
96 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 41.
97 Indeed, this move was one that Justice Marshall directly encouraged in his dissent to
Rodriguez. Sutton, supra note 94, at 1971.
98 See generally G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1097 (1997).
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Rodriguez99-essentially a state-level bite at the equal protection
apple. 100 State-court suits based on educational inequality among
state school districts, accordingly, initially resembled the
Rodriguez suit in most ways. Like the Rodriguez plaintiffs, state
court plaintiffs systemically challenged the inequality of state
statutes providing for the ways in which money could be raised for
schools. 101
Traditionally, as in Texas during the Rodriguez period, schools
have been funded largely through property taxation, and the
argument in state constitutional equal protection litigation was
that this system of funding violated the constitutional rights of
those students in school districts with low property wealth. 102
Simplified, the argument was that if District A has half the total
property wealth and the same number of students as District B,
then a particular level of tax "effort"'103 in District A will yield half
the revenue, and thus half the funding per pupil, as the same level
of tax effort in District B.104 Plaintiffs in these suits typically
sought greater "horizontal equity" through greater centralization
of funding. 105 That is, they sought to make the levels of local
99 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 48, at 1022-28 (discussing school finance litigation in
the states among the traditional forms of "public law litigation").
100 Indeed, judicial federalism was initially predicated on the desire to achieve rights
protections under state constitutions that the Burger Court was unwilling to recognize. See
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977) ("Yet, the very premise of the cases that foreclose federal
remedies constitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the breach. With the federal
locus of our double protections weakened, our liberties cannot survive if the states betray
the trust the Court has put in them. And if that trust is, for the Court, strong enough to
override the risk that some states may not live up to it, how much more strongly should we
trust state courts whose manifest purpose is to expand constitutional protections. With
federal scrutiny diminished, state courts must respond by increasing their own.").
101 See generally Sutton, supra note 94 (analyzing the state court plaintiffs challenge to
state education finance statutes that led to unequal funding for certain school districts).
102 WOOD, supra note 27, at 65-66.
103 In property taxation, the concept of "tax effort" refers to the millage rate charged to
each property owner as a yearly ad valorem tax on the property. Millage is expressed in
thousandths of a dollar, as compared to total property value. Thus, a millage rate of ten
would require that the homeowner pay a tax equal to one percent of the total property value
each year (ten one-thousandths equals one one-hundredth of a dollar). For a home with a
value of $100,000 in a district with a school tax rate of ten mills, then, the tax for the year
would be $1,000.
104 See WOOD, supra note 27, at 15-18 (explaining the relationship between a district's tax
revenues and school funding).
105 Id. at 66.
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education funding independent of local property wealth by
increasing the state role in the funding of education.
Several of these state-level efforts succeeded, but these
successes were accompanied by several state-level failures. 106 As it
had in the federal decision in Rodriguez, the question typically
came down to whether (1) wealth was a suspect classification, or
(2) education was a fundamental right, for equal protection
purposes. 10 7 But as to result, the states split roughly evenly on one
or both of these questions, and in general, states deciding these
questions in the affirmative issued judgments in favor of the
plaintiffs, while states deciding in the negative issued judgments
in favor of the state defendants. 08 Invariably, where plaintiffs
succeeded, legislative changes were required. 0 9 In enacting the
required legislation, state legislatures sometimes sought the
advice of the expert witnesses who had testified in the cases, but
no courts actually ordered any particular policies to be enacted
106 See Bauries, supra note 10, at 328-33 (outlining the successes and failures during the
"equality" wave of state constitutional litigation).
107 WOOD, supra note 27, at 65-67.
108 Bauries, supra note 10, at 328-33.
109 Some states attempted-largely unsuccessfully-to impose "Robin Hood" methods on
their wealthier districts, whereby the states "recaptured" a portion of the money raised
locally over and above a state-determined baseline funding level and redistributed the
recaptured funds among the poorer districts. See generally Maurice Dyson, The Death of
Robin Hood-Proposals for Overhauling Public School Finance, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POLVY 1 (2004) (analyzing the various changes proposed to eliminate or severely curtail the
use of "Robin Hood" financing in one Texas school district). Other states created "minimum
foundation" programs that guaranteed a certain basic level of funding from state and local
taxation to each district, allowing localities to supplement with additional local taxation.
WOOD, supra note 27, at 19-39. This remedy at least created an equal baseline, but it did
nothing to rein in the spending of wealthy districts, and thus wide inequalities persisted.
Still other states created "sliding scale" funding, whereby the legislature or state education
department established a required expenditure level per pupil (often including in this
number variations based on "vertical equity" to reflect the additional cost of educating
students with special needs through "weighting"). Id. Then, the state required a certain
local tax effort from each district. Where districts were able to raise enough funds to cover
the required per pupil expenditure level through local taxation, state subsidies were
minimal, and local spending was capped at or near the state-established level. See
generally Carolyn D. Herrington & Virginia Weider, Equity, Adequacy and Vouchers: Past
and Present School Finance Litigation in Florida, 27 J. EDUC. FIN. 517 (2001) (detailing
Florida's education finance scheme, which uses a sliding scale). Where local efforts were
insufficient, the state provided funds from sales, income, or excise taxes to make up the
difference. Id. This latter approach eliminated the "Robin Hood" problem and created a
system with smaller variations in spending levels, but it left some wealthier districts feeling
unduly limited. It also left the state open to the challenge that the established statewide
expenditure level per pupil was itself inadequate.
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and only one equality-of-funding case resulted in a pre-judgment
consent decree.1 10
Thus, the systemic approach to education finance litigation
grew out of the nature of the claims initially filed-particularly
their similarity to the rejected federal equal protection claims-
and it initially yielded successes in some states, leading to
confidence that where reformers had failed in federal court, they
could succeed in state courts on similar arguments. A successful
argument that the system itself was based on unconstitutional
discrimination against those with lower property wealth required
a system-wide elimination or reformation of laws based on such
discrimination."11
However, unlike in desegregation litigation, where remedies
focused on the district, harms to education finance equity could be
remedied only through state-level policymaking directed toward
eliminating the effects of local property wealth on per pupil
funding. Because state legislatures stand in a co-equal status to
state supreme courts, this systemic remedial requirement caused
state courts to be very restrained in their orders, often providing
state legislatures with encouragement, rather than direction. 11
2
Thus, these equality claims and remedies were inherently
systemic and collective, similar to typical institutional reform
litigation claims, but on an even broader, statewide scale, and with
less directive remediation.
Later, when equal protection arguments began to lose favor
with state courts, reformers began to move away from pure equal
protection arguments and emphasized instead the quality-based
terms of state constitutional education clauses, arguing for
educational adequacy.1 13  Although the theory of educational
adequacy, as a non-relative entitlement, differed from the theory
of educational equality, as a relational or comparative protection,
110 See Md. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bradford, 875 A.2d 703, 709-10 (Md. 2005) (describing
the 1995 consent decree in the ongoing case).
M See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 939-40, 958 (Cal. 1976) (ordering the
restructuring of California's state school financing system).
112 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 217 (N.J. 1972) ("Nothing herein shall be
construed as requiring the Legislature to adopt a specific system of financing or taxation.
The Legislature may approach the goal required by the Education Clause by any methods
reasonably calculated to accomplish that purpose consistent with the equal protection
requirements of law.").
113 See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third
Wave" From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1151, 1157-62 (1995).
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the structure and the framing of the cases remained systemic. 114
Opponents of this newly dominant theory contended that state
courts were ill-suited to pass judgment on the statewide priority-
setting appropriations decisions of elected legislatures,
notwithstanding that courts may be suited to evaluate legislatively
created inequalities." 5 However, when defendants in educational
adequacy cases began to press the courts with these separation of
powers arguments, both courts and scholars cited the fact that
both federal and state courts in institutional reform litigation over
desegregation and school finance equality had exhibited the
competence to engage in the review and management of legislative
policymaking," 6 thus justifying the continuation of the systemic
approach as the cases transitioned from equality-dominant to
adequacy-dominant.
C. REFORM LITIGATION AND PATH DEPENDENCE
Today, the influence of the federal institutional reform
litigation model on state constitutional education litigation is quite
clear." 7 The most common plaintiffs in educational adequacy suits
are not individuals, but groups of school districts and advocacy
organizations, 118 and the most common relief requested is
114 See William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1640 (1989)
(describing the systemic focus of education finance litigation as adequacy suits began to
emerge).
115 E.g., Joshua Dunn & Martha Derthick, Adequacy Litigation and the Separation of
Powers, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 322
(Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007).
116 See, e.g., Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1535 (2007) (advocating for participatory
judicial review based on judicial competence to manage large-scale institutional reform
litigation remedies); Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of
Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1057-58 (1993) (same); Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions
and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989) (same); George D. Brown,
Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on the State School Finance
Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543 (1994) (same).
117 In addition to litigants approaching it as institutional reform litigation, commentators
have prominently analyzed it as such. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 48, at 1022
(describing and defending state education litigation as a type of institutional reform
litigation).
1s See, e.g., Sonja Ralston Elder, Enforcing Public Educational Rights via a Private Right
of Action, 1 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 143-44 (2009) ("In more than 80 percent of
[cases filed by 20091, a school district or nonprofit organization was a named plaintiff. In
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declaratory or injunctive and directed at state-level policymakers
for statewide application, rather than for the remediation of
individual harms. 119 The implicit (and sometimes explicit) goal of
most plaintiffs is to achieve what the plaintiffs achieved in the
seminal 1989 Kentucky case, Rose v. Council for Better Education,
Inc.,120 wherein the state supreme court invalidated the entire
state system of education and issued a declaration laying out
guidelines for the state legislature to remake the system from
scratch. This desire to remake the entire system has its roots in
the line of precedent stretching back to Brown, and the state court
suits are plausibly seen as the result of path dependence on the
federal institutional reform model.
Legal scholars have for some time been interested in the idea of
path dependence-roughly defined as the tendency of actors in a
system to follow a path once blazed. Oona Hathaway, for example,
has persuasively demonstrated that the system of precedent and
stare decisis in law is an inherently path-dependent process. 121
She has also shown, however, that such path dependence, though
at times usefully constraining, can become costly over time, and
that courts should remain attentive to this phenomenon and be
willing to relax the rules of stare decisis when the costs of
tradition outweigh its benefits.1 22 A normatively undesirable form
of path dependence in the law, therefore, might be exemplified
where courts follow a path of past practices blindly, with little or
no reflection as to whether the path is a sound one.
State constitutionalists have identified a particular form of
normatively undesirable path dependence practiced by state courts
and labeled it "lockstepping." Lockstepping refers to the practice
in state courts of unreflectively adopting rights doctrines that the
federal courts have developed over time and applying these
doctrines to state constitutional provisions that appear to provide
the remaining eight cases in which all plaintiffs were individual students, the suits were
filed as or treated as class actions rather than individual suits.").
119 See, e.g., Thro, supra note 114, at 1640 & n.7 (describing the majority of cases as
"declaratory judgment actions of two distinct varieties," actions seeking declarations of
inequality and actions seeking declarations of inadequacy).
120 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989).
121 Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IowA L. REV. 601, 602-04 (2001).
122 Id. at 660-61 (suggesting that in certain scenarios the court should "relax the doctrine
of stare decisis" and "reconsider the issue with a more critical eye toward precedents").
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for similar rights.123 Some state constitutionalists have also been
interested in a more subtle form of lockstepping than the
lockstepping of doctrine. This form is the lockstepping of
conceptions of rights from federal to state courts, and it is most
easily seen in the context of state constitutional rights that do not
have federal analogues, such as the right to education.' 24
"Conceptual convergence," as I have termed it, should concern us if
it means that state courts, in adjudicating unique state
constitutional rights, are unduly constraining their own
interpretations or approaches, especially unwittingly, by trying to
fit their conceptions of unique state constitutional rights to
existing conceptions of distinct federal constitutional rights.
The movement of institutional education reform litigation from
federal court, where it succeeded to a point in policing systemic
inequalities, to state courts, where it is currently employed to
police overall inadequacies in funding, is also a form of
convergence or lockstepping-a lockstepping of adjudicatory forms
from one rights system to another. But is this movement an
undesirable form of lockstepping? For several reasons, it appears
to be. First, the rights (assuming for now that "rights" are in fact
at issue in state constitutional education litigation) are different in
nature. If a right to education exists under state constitutions, the
right is a positive right,' 25 whereas the entire institutional reform
apparatus of the federal courts was constructed to enforce negative
rights.126
Second, the sorts of rights at issue in state constitutional
education litigation, when approached systemically, require
affirmative action on the part of the state legislature for
vindication. Accordingly, the claims ask the courts to determine
whether the legislature has engaged in appropriate action to
benefit the plaintiffs and other students in the state-in short,
whether the legislature has done enough, usually meaning
123 See Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-
by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1505-06
(2005) (describing lockstepping with the label "unreflective adoptionism").
124 See Bauries, supra note 10, at 335 (describing this theory in the education context
through analysis of Robinson).
125 See generally Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights,
20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989).
126 See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text (discussing the kinds of claims generally
at issue in federal institutional reform litigation).
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whether it has appropriated enough funds to maintain an
adequate educational system. A litigation approach that asks the
state judiciary to pass judgment on whether the state legislature
has appropriated sufficient statewide funds for a public benefit
makes inter-branch confrontation very likely. 127 In fact, it is hard
to imagine such a claim being remediated in any other way than
the judicial direction (either explicit or implicit) of public
policymaking.
Third, and most importantly, the nature of an education clause
claim gives rise to all of the dangers that Fuller warned us of when
courts attempt to solve polycentric problems through judicial
orders, particularly the problem of courts turning resource
allocation problems into claims of collective "right."128  Indeed,
state courts have recognized these problems, but their responses to
these problems have created another problem, a paradox truly
unique to state courts-the subversion of positive rights through
their purported enforcement. The next section explores this
problem.
D. SYSTEMIC REMEDIES AND INDIVIDUAL POSITIVE RIGHTS
As introduced above, if an individual constitutional right to an
adequate education exists, it is a positive or affirmative right.129
As David Currie explained years ago, positive rights are
entitlements to government services, whereas negative rights are
immunities from government action. 130 The claims presented in
educational adequacy litigation are founded on constitutional
provisions that are stated affirmatively-that guarantee certain
things to the people from their government, rather than forbidding
certain government actions against individuals. And the harm is a
failure to do something, or more commonly the failure to do enough
of something.
127 See Joshua Dunn & Martha Derthick, Adequacy Litigation and the Separation of
Powers, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 322,
324-36 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (discussing the "plain" challenge
that the separation of powers poses for educational adequacy lawsuits on a systemic level).
128 Fuller, supra note 49, at 401.
129 See generally Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights,
20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989).
130 See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864, 874 (1986) (distinguishing between positive remedies for negative rights violations and
positive constitutional rights themselves).
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The upshot of this distinction is that, if a court determines that
a positive right has been violated, then the violation must be due
to lack of sufficient action to fulfill the positive right. Naturally,
the remedy would be the judicial compelling of the withheld action
through mandamus or injunction. But where claims are systemic,
this natural conclusion creates a significant separation of powers
problem, in that the natural remedy for a systemic violation is the
judicial ordering of the making of positive social policy, a function
clearly reserved to the legislature in each state.'81 Courts have
responded to this problem by either avoiding the rights question
altogether or merely "talking rights"132 without actually enforcing
rights.
Federal institutional reform litigation is focused at a base level
with the protection of individual rights, usually rights to equal
protection or due process, and its systemic focus comes from the
fact that many rights-holders are harmed in identical ways, for
example through a district-wide policy of school segregation. 133
State constitutional educational adequacy litigation, in contrast,
focuses directly on systemic legislative duties, rather than
aggregate violations of individual rights.134 Rights generally are
discussed in two contexts. The first is as a means of responding to
an objection based on non-justiciability. The second is as a means
of adding rhetorical force to the court's ultimate decision.
1. Individual Education Rights and Generalized Standing. In
school finance adequacy litigation, individual students sometimes
participate as parties or witnesses, but the claims generally do not
focus on the educational entitlements of these individual
students. 135 The student parties are there mostly to establish
standing, not to seek their own individual remedies. And as a
result, judicial remedial orders are never directed at curing
individual students' educational inadequacies, even where those
individual inadequacies are in evidence. 136
131 Dunn & Derthick, supra note 115, at 324-25.
132 See generally GLENDON, supra note 1.
133 See supra notes 21-76 and accompanying text (discussing institutional reform
litigation).
134 Bauries, supra note 12, at 736-37.
135 See Elder, supra note 118, at 138.
136 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989)
(following an extensive analysis of both district-level and student-level inadequacies and a
judgment of unconstitutionality, stating, "We decline to issue any injunctions, restraining
orders, writs of prohibition or writs of mandamus.").
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In response to objections based on the political question
doctrine, or asserting that claims present only generalized
grievances rather than live controversies, courts sometimes
declare that state residents have a "right to education." However,
even where courts declare this "right to education" to be violated,
their decisions always consist either of statewide or regional
injunctions, or declarations of unconstitutionality. 137 Thus, the
"right to education" in these states seems to be nothing more than
the standing of an individual to assert a generalized grievance
concerning the systemic adequacy of the state education system.
In fact, at least one state court has explicitly adopted this
conception as its interpretation of the "right to education" in a
systemic suit. In Claremont School District v. Governor, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court declared:
The right to an adequate education mandated by the
constitution is not based on the exclusive needs of a
particular individual, but rather is a right held by the
public to enforce the State's duty. Any citizen has
standing to enforce this right.138
This interpretation allowed rights-based language to give rise to a
justiciable system-wide claim, which ultimately resulted in a
systemic order directed at the legislature, 139 but the same
interpretation also subverted any individual entitlement to an
137 See, e.g., Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) (after
declaring that education is a "fundamental right," ordering the state to redesign the
statewide school system entirely); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,
201 (Ky. 1989) (stating, "[O]ur citizens are given a fundamental right to education in our
Constitution," but going on to issue a system-wide declaratory judgment).
138 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993).
139 The court stated its decision as follows:
Given the complexities of our society today, the State's constitutional duty
extends beyond mere reading, writing and arithmetic. It also includes
broad educational opportunities needed in today's society to prepare
citizens for their role as participants and as potential competitors in today's
marketplace of ideas. We are confident that the legislature and the
Governor will fulfill their responsibility with respect to defining the
specifics of, and the appropriate means to provide through public education,
the knowledge and learning essential to the preservation of a free
government.
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adequate education that might otherwise have been derived from
the New Hampshire Constitution's education clause.
2. The Rhetorical Force of "Fundamental" Rights. In another
group of cases, state supreme courts, engaging a "lockstepped"
equal protection analysis, have come to the conclusion that
education is a "fundamental right."140  Declaring a right to be
"fundamental" in equal protection analysis allowed some early
state courts to apply strict scrutiny to unequal funding burdens on
local school district residents, regardless of whether wealth was
also held to be a suspect classification.1 41 However, designating a
right as "fundamental" does not settle the question whether the
right in question is an individual entitlement standing alone or a
relational right to equal treatment, and it certainly does not settle
the question whether, if it is an entitlement, it entitles its holder
to a certain quantum of whatever the right protects.
One example will suffice to illustrate this point. The federal
fundamental right to privacy requires that a state refrain from
prohibiting its married citizens from using contraceptives,1 42
discriminating against unmarried couples in the regulation of
contraceptives, 143 or even discriminating against purchasers under
sixteen years of age in permitting the sale of contraceptives.1 44
What it does not require is any state to provide contraceptives to
anyone. It merely protects against the state actively stopping
contraceptive use, or discriminating as to who is allowed to
purchase contraceptives. The way in which courts rule against
these actions is through strict judicial scrutiny over any police
power justifications offered by the state for legislating any such
prohibition or discrimination. This is how all "fundamental rights"
work in equal protection analysis-as triggers for the court to
strictly scrutinize active government prohibitions against, or
discrimination in the regulation of, private exercises of the right-
140 See Bauries, supra note 10, at 328-33 (explaining that the lockstepping that occurred
in the area of educational equality litigation involved adopting both the tiered scrutiny
analysis found in federal equal protection doctrine and the triggers for potential strict
judicial scrutiny under that tiered system (fundamental rights and suspect classifications));
see also supra notes 97-116 and accompanying text (discussing equal protection analysis in
state courts after Rodriguez).
141 See Bauries, supra note 10, at 333-34 (highlighting state courts' focus on educational
adequacy instead of equality, and individual claim-rights against legislatures).
142 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
143 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
144 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 697-99 (1977).
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not as requirements that government act affirmatively to fulfill a
person's right. In other words, in equal protection analysis,
fundamental rights are presumptive immunities against
government action, not entitlements.
In educational adequacy suits (which do involve claims that the
government must affirmatively act to fulfill individual
entitlements), courts initially were faced with the question
whether the state constitution guaranteed each individual an
educational entitlement of a certain quality. Eliding the
distinction between positive and negative rights, the courts in
these later educational adequacy cases at times have begun with
the "fundamental rights" language of the early lockstepping equal
protection decisions and declared the question settled, 145 and at
other times have conflated the positive rights question with the
lockstepped equal protection analysis.146 Doing so, while ignoring
the analytical context of "fundamental rights" doctrine as it has
developed in equal protection law, simply converted negative
equality rights to positive adequacy rights with little or no
independent analysis of the state constitution's language for
whether it established a positive individual entitlement.
Considering that state courts in suits against coordinate branches
of government already have a built-in institutional legitimacy
problem to overcome, 147 failing to appropriately justify these newly
declared rights was a mistake. 48
The use of "fundamental rights" in the realm of positive
educational entitlements, once coupled with the systemic nature of
145 See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Fund., Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 235 (Conn.
2010) (concluding from the finding in an earlier equality case that the "fundamental right to
an education" must have some substantive qualitative content).
146 See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1358-59 (N.H. 1997)
("Second, and of persuasive force, is the simple fact that even a minimalist view of
educational adequacy recognizes the role of education in preparing citizens to participate in
the exercise of voting and first amendment rights. The latter being recognized as
fundamental, it is illogical to place the means to exercise those rights on less substantial
constitutional footing than the rights themselves. We hold that in this State a
constitutionally adequate public education is a fundamental right.").
147 Dunn & Derthick, supra note 115, at 324 (referring to the separation of powers
problems in educational adequacy litigation as "plain").
148 See Michael L. Wells, "Sociological Legitimacy" in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1011, 1020-21 (2007) (examining the use of written and published reasoning
in legal opinions to foster the perceived legitimacy of a judicial opinion, and explaining that,
to achieve "legal legitimacy," a judicial opinion must contain "a full and candid exposition of
the Court's reasoning").
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educational adequacy claims, made it inevitable that state courts
would overreach. If the right to adequate education is both
positive and "fundamental," then a restrained or deferential
judicial declaration of what that right requires statewide seems
inappropriate, and so the courts addressing the merits of
educational adequacy claims have reached for lofty expressions
and statute-like lists of "minimal" requirements for the statewide
school system.
For example, the Kentucky Constitution's education clause
states, "The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation,
provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the
state.."149 In its path-breaking decision in 1989, after holding that
education was a "fundamental right, ' 150 the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that the word "efficient" in this clause means:
(1) The establishment, maintenance and funding of
common schools in Kentucky is the sole responsibility
of the General Assembly.
(2) Common schools shall be free to all.
(3) Common schools shall be available to all
Kentucky children.
(4) Common schools shall be substantially uniform
throughout the state.
(5) Common schools shall provide equal educational
opportunities to all Kentucky children, regardless of
place of residence or economic circumstances.
(6) Common schools shall be monitored by the
General Assembly to assure that they are operated
with no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement,
and with no political influence.
(7) The premise for the existence of common schools
is that all children in Kentucky have a constitutional
right to an adequate education.
(8) The General Assembly shall provide funding
which is sufficient to provide each child in Kentucky
an adequate education.
149 KY. CONST. § 183.
150 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 201 (Ky. 1989).
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(9) An adequate education is one which has as its
goal the development of the seven capacities recited
previously.15'
By themselves, most of these items seem reasonable
interpretations of the words "efficient system of common schools,"
which can reasonably be read to contain a mandate of equal
treatment. However, Subsection (9) on the list cross-references
another portion of the same opinion, where the court expands on
the "capacities" that must be part of an "efficient" education
system's curriculum:
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to
enable students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of
economic, social, and political systems to enable the
student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient
understanding of governmental processes to enable the
student to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-
knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts
to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural
and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or
preparation for advanced training in either academic
or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose
and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient
levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public
school students to compete favorably with their
counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in
the job market. 152
Whatever the merits of this exhaustive list, it strains credulity
that the list is made a mandated curricular framework by the
words, "efficient system of common schools." Adding to this
problem, the Kentucky Supreme Court's declaration of these
requirements (and its declaration that the current system did not
151 Id. at 212-13.
152 Id. at 212.
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meet them) did not direct any relief to any student.153 The court's
declaration operated instead as a general legislative-type
pronouncement, rather than as the resolution of an adverse claim.
The effect of stating the requirements of the system in this way
was profound. The Kentucky decision has been cited or relied on
in nearly every state education clause case since. Some state
supreme courts have even adopted the Kentucky court's exact
formulation verbatim as the correct interpretation of their own
state constitutions. For example, in Massachusetts, which has a
state constitutional education clause that could not be more
textually and historically distinct from Kentucky's, 154  after
engaging in a thoughtful analysis of the intent of the colonial
drafters, the semantic meaning of the specific words of the
education clause, and the structure of the Massachusetts
government, the court articulated a set of "guidelines" for the
legislature to follow in designing the education system. 155 These
guidelines were a verbatim recitation of the seven curricular
capacities articulated in Rose by the Kentucky Supreme Court.156
The Massachusetts Court likewise did not issue an individual
remedial order.
Many other states have issued declaratory "guidelines" for
prospective state legislation without ordering relief for any
individual. Some of these states, such as Massachusetts 157 and
New Hampshire, 158 adopted the Kentucky court's test wholesale.
153 Id. at 215 ('Ve decline to issue any injunctions, restraining orders, writs of prohibition
or writs of mandamus.").
154 Compare KY. CONST. § 183 ('The general assembly shall, by appropriate legislation,
provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State.") (ratified in 1891),
with MAss. CONST. Pt. II, Ch. 5, § 2 ('Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused
generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights
and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of
education in the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people,
it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this
commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of
them; especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the
towns .. ") (ratified in 1780 and still the oldest continuously functioning constitutional
document in the world).
155 McDuffy v. Sec. of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993).
156 See id. (quoting the Kentucky formulation as a set of guidelines for the legislature's
redesign of the state education system).
157 See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the Massachusetts Supreme
Court's adoption of the Kentucky guidelines).
158 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997).
[Vol. 48:949984
2014] THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 985
Others, such as New York 159 and South Carolina, 160 derived their
own lists of guidelines which greatly resembled those articulated
in Rose. Later courts sometimes adopted guidelines from courts
other than Kentucky's. For instance, the Connecticut Supreme
Court adopted as its standard the guidelines developed by the New
York Court of Appeals, despite some textual differences between
the two states' constitutions.' 61 The Kentucky court itself relied on
the earlier pronouncements of the West Virginia Supreme Court in
interpreting that state's constitution, which requires a "thorough
and efficient" education system, as compared with Kentucky's
"efficient system" command. 162
It is damaging to the legitimacy of independent state
constitutionalism that these declarations exist. They illustrate an
activism in reading state constitutional terms that would never be
tolerated at the federal level, and they accordingly call into
question the judicial federalism project.163  Undergirding the
judicial federalism project is the idea that state courts can be
trusted to develop independent interpretive doctrines of
constitutional rights as "real" courts, based on the unique text,
159 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995).
16 Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) ("[Plroviding
students adequate and safe facilities in which they have the opportunity to acquire: 1) the
ability to read, write, and speak the English language, and knowledge of mathematics and
physical science; 2) a fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and
of history and governmental processes; and 3) academic and vocational skills.").
161 Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 254 (Conn. 2010).
Compare CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ('CThere shall always be free public elementary and
secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by
appropriate legislation."), with N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (' The legislature shall provide for
the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children
of this state may be educated.").
162 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 210 (Ky. 1989) ('The court
continued by recognizing areas in which each child educated in the system should develop
to full capacity: 1) literacy; 2) mathematical ability; 3) knowledge of government sufficient
to equip the individual to make informed choices as a citizen; 4) self-knowledge sufficient to
intelligently choose life work; 5) vocational or advanced academic training; 6) recreational
pursuits; 7) creative interests; 8) social ethics. Support services, such as good physical
facilities and instructional resources, and state and local monitoring for waste and
incompetency were considered to be implicit in the definition of 'a thorough and efficient
system.'" (quoting Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979))).
163 Judicial federalism, or as it is sometimes called, the "New Judicial Federalism,"
denotes an independent state constitutionalism exemplified by judicial interpretations of
state Constitutions that diverge from federal interpretations of similar provisions in the
Federal Constitution. See Tarr, supra note 98, at 1097 (describing New Judicial Federalism
as "the increased reliance by state judges on state declarations of rights to secure rights
unavailable under the United States Constitution").
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history, and structure of state constitutions, as well as the unique
populations that ratified each document and currently live under
it.164 Already judicial federalism has been called into question
effectively on the grounds of lack of distinctiveness in its discourse
on rights analogous to rights found in the Federal Constitution.165
It would be a shame (from a perspective favoring the value of
independent state constitutionalism) if the discourse on provisions
without federal analogues were to become similarly impoverished
because courts were reluctant to limit themselves to speaking as
courts speak-through resolving disputed claims of right based on
the unique terms of each state's document and the facts applying
to the parties involved in the dispute.
3. "Legislative Holdings" and Fiduciary Legislative Duty. The
use of the systemic declaration in many of these cases gives rise to
the concern that state courts, even where they restrain themselves
from ordering specific spending and taxation increases, are in fact
acting more legislatively than judicially. Declaratory judgments
such as the one issued by the Supreme Court of Kentucky read like
legislation. Lawrence Solum has ably questioned whether courts
of last resort ought to be in the business of issuing what he terms
"legislative holdings"-statements in judicial opinions, usually
beginning with the words, "We hold that," and placing prospective
requirements on legal actors beyond what the resolution of the
facts of the case require. 166  Solum sees these sorts of
pronouncements as problematic because they amount to judicial
overreach.167
But there is another problem with legislative holdings-one
unique to the realm of affirmative legislative duties, such as the
duty to provide for an education system. As to such affirmative
duties, state legislatures stand in a fiduciary capacity to the state
16 Id. at 1098.
165 See generally James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992) (attributing the status of state constitutional law today to the
failure of state courts to develop a coherent discourse of state constitutional law).
Nevertheless, the movement to encourage state courts to develop independent state
constitutional jurisprudence continues, and it is therefore important that this movement
not be undercut by state court overreach.
166 Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis,
Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 188
(2006).
167 Id.
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polity, with duties of care and loyalty.168 Such duties require clear
lines of accountability because, notwithstanding the potential for
judicial review, the political process is the principal check on the
legislature's performance of its duties to the people. However, the
common use of the declaratory judgment that holds the system
unconstitutional and makes a broad, legislative pronouncement as
to what substantive elements the state system must contain
absolves the legislature of these obligations and instead allows the
legislature to point its collective finger at the courts any time it
does what inevitably must be done-raise taxes to provide for a
desirable public benefit.
In the short term, this political cover can be a good thing-it
certainly was in Kentucky after Rose.169 But over time, if the
judiciary's practice is to examine the entire state education
system, to pass judgment on that system, and then to articulate
policy goals that must be pursued in remaking the system, then
this practice is likely to lead to a kind of "legislative learned
helplessness,"'170 a situation in which the legislature does not truly
engage the legislative process with due care until it gets guidance
from the court as to how it must proceed to avoid a constitutional
problem. Systemic judicial review can be focused on process,
rather than product, to minimize this problem, 17' but a better way
to avoid it-one that preserves the traditional judicial function
better-would be to avoid systemic judicial review altogether
wherever possible.
Framing educational adequacy cases systemically and naming
the state, the executive branch, or the legislature as the defendant
sets up an obvious inter-branch conflict. 72 Any decision holding
18 See generally Bauries, supra note 19 (examining the fiduciary duties that state
constitutions place on state legislatures).
169 See Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Authority:
The Kentucky Case, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341, 343 (1991) ("The case caused the legislature
to fashion new tax legislation which resulted in increased revenues of over one billion
dollars. Without the impetus of the court it is doubtful that any new tax funds would have
been found, and certainly few, if any, new funds would have been allocated to the public
schools. The court provided the legislature with both the nerve and the rationale to raise
taxes, equalize school funding, and make other necessary changes.").
170 See Scott R. Bauries, American School Finance Litigation and the Right to Education
in South Africa, 27 S. AFR. PUB. L. 409 (2012) (developing the idea of legislative learned
helplessness in a comparative context).
171 Bauries, supra note 19, at 762-64 (detailing a process-based form of systemic review
founded on the idea of the legislature as the fiduciary of the people).
172 Dunn & Derthick, supra note 115, at 351.
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the state school system unconstitutional due to an inadequacy in
funding portends the judiciary ordering the legislature to increase
educational appropriations, and therefore, to raise taxes or cut
other spending. Few observers would see this as a legitimate role
for the judiciary, but where the constitutional flaw is the failure of
the legislature to provide enough of a statewide public benefit, this
mandated appropriations remedy is the natural choice.
Understanding this inevitability, state courts choosing to enter the
fray over affirmative legislative duties most often prudently choose
to issue declarations that the constitutional requirement has not
been met, rather than directive remedial orders to provide for the
funding that has not yet been provided.
But not all state courts have been similarly restrained. Some
state courts, such as Florida's,173 have responded to the inevitable
institutional conflict with complete-one might say undue 174-
restraint, refusing to rule at all on education rights claims. 175
Others opt to confront the inter-branch power struggle head on
and issue systemic injunctions ordering statewide or regional
expenditure increases. 176 The exemplar for this approach is New
Jersey, where the courts have been locked in an institutional
conflict with the legislature and executive branch spanning forty
years and nearly thirty separate decisions of the New Jersey
Supreme Court. 77 Nevertheless, though each of these approaches
is distinct from the others, all are decidedly systemic approaches to
enforcing (or declining to enforce) the obligations of a state
constitution's education clause. None of these approaches leads to
the individual remediation of any individual rights violations.
This systemic approach to enforcement therefore subverts the very
idea of an individual right to adequate education.
173 See Coal. For Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400,
407-08 (Fla. 1996) (dismissing an educational adequacy suit as a non-justiciable political
question).
174 See, e.g., Larry J. Obhof, Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State School
Finance Litigation, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 569, 594-97 (2004) (terming these sorts of
pre-merits dismissals "judicial abdication").
175 See Bauries, supra note 12, at 740-41 (noting that, in most of these cases, courts
lockstep the federal political question doctrine, holding that the state constitution's
education clause lacks "judicially manageable standards" for adjudication and remediation).
176 See id. at 741-42 (discussing directive systemic remediation cases).
177 See Bauries, supra note 10, at 334-36 (discussing the New Jersey saga, which remains
ongoing at this writing).
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Accepting these conclusions does not require accepting that
positive rights to adequate education do not exist, or that they
cannot exist, or that state courts are not competent to examine the
question. But it does mean that state courts never have seriously
examined the question whether their state constitutions establish
positive individual rights to adequate education. State courts can,
and should, engage this question seriously and on its own merits,
but as shown above, they cannot accomplish this task through
systemic institutional reform litigation. Rather, to seriously
engage the important question whether state constitutions provide
for individual positive rights, state courts must reject the current
approach and its systemic adjudication of polycentric problems in
their entirety, and begin to embrace individual entitlement claims
for individual remedies. The next section considers a
constitutional methodology that can usefully undergird such
individual claims.
III. A COMMON LAW STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
Rather than the systemic institutional reform litigation
approach that reformers have used thus far to enforce an
ostensible "right to education," another approach would be both
more effective and more protective of individual rights, along with
both judicial and legislative prerogatives. This approach is
derived from the common law theory of constitutional
interpretation, first fully developed by David Strauss. 178 "Common
law constitutionalism," as it is now generally called, refers to an
incrementalist adjudicatory process that takes seriously the
constraining forces of both tradition179 and convention.180 The
constraint of tradition generally counsels for adherence to
incrementally developed precedent, along with a willingness to
discard or alter such precedent only in the face of persistent
evidence of changing societal norms or a principled argument for
manifest error in the prior precedent.181  The constraint of
178 David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877
(1996).
179 Id. at 891-92.
180 Id. at 906-07.
181 Id. at 934-35. An example of the first basis would be the Supreme Court's gradual
move away from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and the constitutional freedom of
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convention generally counsels for adherence to constitutional text
as a primary, but not always completely dispositive, source of
meaning.18 2  Neither of these constraints is absolute, but
overcoming either requires principled reasons best reflected in a
judicial opinion rendered in the context of a live controversy.18 3
At this point, to avoid confusion, it is necessary to distinguish
common law constitutionalism from the constitutional common
law. Constitutional common law, as developed by Henry
Monaghan, describes a body of doctrine that assists the courts in
enforcing the terms of the Constitution.1 8 4 This body of doctrine
mostly consists of judicially developed, prophylactic rules, such as
the Miranda doctrine, which Congress could alter significantly
were it to choose to do so.18 5 In short, constitutional common law
describes a discrete body of rules, not a method of adjudication. In
contrast, common law constitutionalism describes a methodology
of adjudication of constitutional issues.18 6 This methodology takes
its form from the methodologies that common law courts employ to
make law in areas such as contracts, torts, and property. But
common law constitutionalism does not denote any body of rules
itself.187 Thus, common law constitutional methods might result in
the courts developing rules that Henry Monaghan would recognize
as constitutional common law,188 but it might also result in the
courts issuing less politically negotiable interpretations of
constitutional text.
It is also important to distinguish my argument here for using
common law constitutionalism as a method of interpreting state
constitutions from a related-and important-argument recently
developed at length by Helen Hershkoff, a frequent and
contract. An example of the second would be the Court's rejection of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
182 Strauss, supra note 178, at 995.
183 Id. at 984, 997.
184 Henry Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
185 See id. at 2 (discussing the Miranda doctrine as an example of constitutional common
law).
186 See generally Abigail R. Moncrief, Common-Law Constitutionalism, The Constitutional
Common Law, and the Validity of the Individual Mandate, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1245 (2012)
(illustrating the difference between common-law constitutionalism and constitutional
common law by evaluating the purported constitutionality of the individual mandate).
187 See id. at 1246 (distinguishing the method of creating the rules from the rules created).
188 Id.
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distinguished commentator on state constitutional rights
enforcement.18 9 Hershkoff argues-quite persuasively-that state
constitutional rights provisions, even the more "aspirational"
provisions such as those protecting rights to welfare, education,
and health care, should influence the development of the
traditional common law of torts, contracts, property, and agency in
the states.190  As this Article does, Hershkoffs article favors an
incremental approach to law development, but Hershkoffs focus is
on developing the traditional common law as a body of doctrine by
taking account of constitutional values, 191 whereas the focus of this
Article is on the direct enforcement of the state constitutional
provisions that contain those values. In other words, the focus
here is on the common law method, rather than the common law
itself.
The common law process involves the adjudication of the rights
of specific individuals on narrow issues, rather than the issuance
of broad, legislative-type judicial declarations that attempt to flesh
out the entire, settled meaning of a constitutional scheme.1 92 This
focus on claim-by-claim law development makes common law
constitutionalism the perfect vehicle for deriving content from
vaguely stated positive rights provisions in state constitutions.
As others have pointed out, the chief challenge in enforcing the
education clauses of state constitutions is the "inherently
nebulous" nature of the quality-based terms in each clause. 193 A
189 See generally Helen Hershkoff, "Just Words". Common Law and the Enforcement of
State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521 (2010).
190 See id. at 1533, 1582 (suggesting that common-law development of state constitutional
socio-economic provisions can indirectly influence the development of private laws); see also
Judith S. Kaye, Foreword. The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full Partners
in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 727, 729 (1992) (calling for a
renewed focus on state common law as a complement to state constitutional law).
191 Hershkoff, supra note 189, at 1582.
192 See Strauss, supra note 178, at 894 (describing the traditionalist constraint as one
directed at recognizing the common-law virtues of "humility, the limits of human reason,
and distrust of abstract argument," all virtues better served through incrementalist
decisionmaking on the claims of identifiable individuals than broad-scale systemic claims,
which tend toward the abstract and theoretical); Moncrief, supra note 186, at 1247
(describing Strauss's book-length articulation of his theory thus: "A court announces a
constitutional rule in the course of deciding a case, sees how that rule works in the world
beyond its doors, and then makes adjustments slowly and carefully through case-by-case
elaboration and with due respect for precedent.").
193 Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance: A Cautionary
Note, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 37, 37 (1996); see also Bauries, supra note 12, at 714 (noting
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common response to objections to the justiciability of education
clauses based on the lack of judicially manageable standards is
that courts interpret vague and subjective terminology in the
Federal Constitution all the time. 194 This claim is certainly true.
The words "due," "cruel," "unusual," "speedy," and "unreasonable"
are all just as vague, subjective, and lacking in a generally
accepted meaning as "thorough," "efficient," "suitable," and
"adequate," so why should we have a problem with state courts
interpreting the latter if we have no problem with federal courts
interpreting the former?
The answer is that we should not have a problem with either.
Interpretation is the quintessential element of the judicial role,
and judges should be very careful (and ordinarily should have
reasons in addition to the vagueness and subjectivity of a term)
when they choose not to engage in this element of their role. 195
However, the methodologies a court engages when it interprets
vague terms such as "unreasonable" or "sufficient," should differ
from the methodologies the court is willing to employ where the
text is clear and admits of only one meaning. The common law
constitutionalist methodology recognizes this truth, and illustrates
its operation through the partial constraint of convention, in the
form of constitutional text. 96 It is appropriate for a court to make
a one-time, legislative pronouncement of the meaning of a clear
provision (or a provision for which clear, contemporaneous
evidence of its meaning exists), as such a pronouncement does not
present a real risk of judicial error, and settling that a word means
just what it says serves the interests of efficiency and
predictability.
In contrast, where terminology is vague, subjective, and elusive
in its natural meaning, courts should be much more cautious-
humble, even.1 97 An incrementalist approach is best suited to
Gillette's recognition of the "inherently nebulous" nature of state constitution education
clauses).
194 See, e.g., State v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 32 P.3d 325, 335-36 (Wyo. 2001) (offering
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause as examples of the courts' ability
to deal with "amorphous" terminology).
195 Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
196 See Strauss, supra note 178, at 906 (describing how the constraint of convention
dictates that when text is relatively clear it should be followed without much
interpretation).
197 See William E. Thro, Judicial Humility: The Enduring Legacy of Rose v. Council for
Better Education, 98 KY. L.J. 717, 722-23 (2010). Thro places the Rose court in the
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nebulous text because nebulous text inherently presents the court
with a much higher possibility of error in interpretation than clear
text. And because judicially announced constitutional law tends to
be, for lack of a better word, "sticky"-an error in a decision that
purports to announce the entire meaning of a vague provision
might be an error that persists for a very long time.198
Borrowing an apt example from Lawrence Rosenthal, imagine
that the Court, acting in a maximalist fashion, fixed the meaning
of "due" in the Due Process Clause in 1900 as requiring personal
service to hale any civil or defendant into court (an accurate
reflection of the state of the law in 1900).199 Now, consider that
issuing a parking ticket to an individual is a form of haling that
person into court, and that parking tickets are almost never served
on individuals personally because it would be administratively
impossible and cost-prohibitive to do so. 200 Administering parking
tickets would therefore be unimaginable under a strict "personal
service" rule, but in 1900 the very idea of parking tickets and the
ubiquity of automobiles would have been unimaginable, so this
problem would not have been anticipated. 0 1 As a result, an
approach that fixed the meaning to some determined original,
widely-understood, semantic meaning would have eventually
resulted in chaos in large cities. The Court, and the law, have
been better served by an incremental approach to due process
because such an approach has forestalled the danger of false
certainty in a highly contextual area of policy.
The existence of a constitutional claim based on a positive
entitlement increases the danger of false certainty. Matters of
positive social policy, such as the provision of sufficient education,
are essentially and continuously contested. What may be the
common wisdom of today will become the discredited mistake of
the past tomorrow. Class sizes are a good example of this constant
category of "judicially humble" courts, but this categorization is based on the court's
remedial restraint. It is my hope that the argument presented here will focus more
attention on the court's interpretive restraint, and therefore humility, at the earlier (and I
argue more important) phase of settling on a meaning for the constitution's words.
198 See Solum, supra note 166, at 156-58 & n.8 (pointing out that the Supreme Court is
loath to reexamine existing precedents, even where these precedents are clearly wrong).
199 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On
Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation... and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV.
1, 12, 20-21 (2007).
200 Id. at 13.
201 Id. at 12.
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back-and-forth. 2 2 At times, the education policy scholarship has
identified small class sizes as an important driver of student
achievement, while at other times the research has questioned the
value of small class sizes. 20 3 If a state court were to issue a
systemic declaratory judgment stating that the state constitution's
education clause requires small class sizes for all of the state's
children in the early grades, for example, the decision would then
tie the hands of the legislature to explore other approaches based
on contrary research. Because it often takes years, or even
decades, to bring a systemic school finance challenge to the point
of state supreme court review, 20 4 such a decision would be unlikely
to be reconsidered quickly, and a judicial mistake might end up
defining educational practice for a generation or more.
Still, the language, though nebulous, is there, and it should be
subject to interpretation, so total abstention would seem to be an
overcorrection for the increased error potential. The better path is
the incrementalist one described by common law constitutionalism.
Incrementally determining the meaning of vague terminology
greatly reduces the danger that wrongheaded, overzealous, or
politically pandering judicial declarations will enshrine as
permanent constitutional law the imperfect common wisdom of one
era. And as it turns out, in the cases generally cited as evidence of
the judiciary's ability to deal with vague and nebulous
terminology-those under the Due Process Clause and the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause for example-courts generally
follow a common law constitutionalist methodology, adding nuance
to the interpretation of the relevant terms case-by-case, in the
context of real facts affecting real individuals. 20 5
202 See generally ALAN B. KRUEGER, ERIC A. HANUSHEK & JENNIFER KING RICE, ECON.
POLICY INST., THE CLASS SIZE DEBATE (Lawrence Michel & Richard Rothstein eds., 2002)
(discussing the positive and negative consequences of having smaller class sizes).
203 See id.
204 See Elder, supra note 118, at 143 (pointing out that adequacy cases often take years to
resolve).
205 See, e.g., Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death:
Charting the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from
the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911, 922-32 (2001) (describing the incremental
development in the law of cruel and unusual punishment that led to exempting the
mentally retarded from the death penalty); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the
Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1047-82 (1984) (discussing the ebb and flow of
procedural due process doctrine through the incremental development of lines of precedent
in challenges to administrative action).
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In such cases, decisions are more likely to be based on small
constitutional moves, rather than grand constitutional
declarations. If an error is made through such interpretation, the
earlier case can be distinguished on its facts, or the minor point of
interpretation that made the difference in the earlier case can be
limited or overruled more easily than a broad legislative
pronouncement from the bench purporting to solve an entire
polycentric social problem all at once. As one scholar pithily
observes, if judges adhere to incremental, fact-bound judging and
observe the rules of precedent, then over time, the law will "work
itself pure."20 6
Employing a common-law-derived process to the development of
state constitutional education clauses would finally make possible
the long-delayed consideration, and perhaps the recognition, of
individual positive constitutional entitlement rights to adequate
education. The next Part considers how the courts might employ a
common law constitutionalist methodology to recognize and define
such rights.
IV. DEFINING THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
This Part makes the case that the interpretation of education
rights provisions in state constitutions will best succeed through
the rights claims of individuals, rather than through systemic
adjudication, declaratory judgments, and structural injunctions.
The argument aims to engender a movement in state
constitutionalism relating to positive rights away from the
undesirable alternatives of total abstention or definition by broad
declaration, and toward definition by incremental enforcement and
experimentation. The key to this move is the adoption by state
courts of a common law approach to constitutional interpretation
and adjudication.
A. COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM AND EDUCATION RIGHTS
To begin the discussion, let us assume a different framing for
an educational adequacy case. Assume that, instead of a case
being filed-to much media fanfare-by an educational advocacy
206 Solum, supra note 166, at 191 (quoting the future Lord Mansfield, then Solicitor
General, in Omychund v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch. 1744)).
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group or an organized group of school districts, the case is filed by
one individual student. This student would claim that her own
affirmative individual right to a certain quality of education has
been denied in the absolute sense (not the relative sense familiar
to individual equality claims). To justify adjudicating such a
claim, a court must first recognize an actual individual
entitlement-based right to education. As discussed above, due to
the systemic reform focus of educational adequacy litigation, this
recognition has not yet occurred, other than rhetorically, in any
state court, nor has any state supreme court seriously considered
the question. 20 7
How, then, would common law constitutionalism deal with the
question? First, like most constitutional approaches, the common
law approach would begin with the text. Constitutional text, as
Strauss explains, may have two distinct roles in the method of the
common law. In one role, the text may simply provide the answer
to a constitutional question.208  For example, some state
constitutions contain provisions that demand specific actions on
the part of the government. The actions might be procedural, such
as the Louisiana Constitution's command that the legislature
negotiate with the state board of education in determining
education funding levels each year.20 9  Or they might be
substantive, such as the Florida Constitution's requirement that
the state provide sufficient education funding to limit class sizes to
certain specified numerical ranges.210
Provisions such as these should be enforced precisely as
written,211 much the same way that the age requirements for
public office are applied under the United States Constitution. 212
The text is clear, and it admits no room for interpretation.
Whether we think it normatively right or wrong for the legislature
to negotiate with the executive branch as to appropriations, the
207 See supra Part III.
208 Strauss, supra note 178, at 911-12.
209 See Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutional Design and Education Reform: Process
Specification in Louisiana, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 42 (2011) (describing this requirement and
the process of negotiation it demands).
210 See Scott R. Bauries, Florida's Past and Future Roles in Education Finance Reform
Litigation, 32 J. EDUC. FIN. 89, 103 (2006) (describing this requirement and the popular
constitutional amendment process that led to its adoption).
211 See Bauries, supra note 209, at 36 (arguing for this sort of strict application in
Louisiana); Bauries, supra note 210, at 98-100 (arguing for strict application in Florida).
212 Strauss, supra note 178, at 906.
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Louisiana Constitution clearly and unambiguously commands it.
Similarly, whether we agree with the policy research that has
identified class size as an important driver of educational
outcomes, or whether we agree with the research questioning that
conclusion, 213 the Florida Constitution demands that class sizes be
kept at certain levels-clearly and explicitly.
But the other role through which the text constrains
interpretation applies more broadly to constitutional law. Most
constitutional provisions are written vaguely, and this vagueness
allows much room for judicial interpretation. Education clauses
certainly serve as an example of this vagueness, as do the Due
Process Clause214 and the Commerce Clause.215 Education clauses
make commands on state legislatures to "make adequate
provision," "establish," "provide for," "maintain," "encourage," or
even "cherish" a public school system, which might be described
using such modifiers as "thorough," "efficient," "complete," or "high
quality," among others. 21 6 These sorts of commands cannot simply
be enforced on their own terms because the terms do not admit of a
generally accepted meaning.21 7
But there is still text in each of these provisions, so what is the
text's role if it does not specify a direct answer to a constitutional
question? As Strauss explains, the text in these clauses (and
indeed in most constitutional clauses) functions to "limit[ ] the set
of acceptable answers" to constitutional questions.218  The
education clauses in state constitutions, in other words, constrain
courts to a certain set of possible interpretations, even though no
state constitutional education clause appears to explicitly mandate
a particular conclusion as to the nature or the quantum of the
educational entitlements it sets up.
For example, if an education clause states that it is "the duty of
the state" to set up and maintain an educational system, then a
court may not interpret the text as merely a power-granting
213 See generally KRUEGER, HANUSHEK & RICE, supra note 202.
214 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
215 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
216 See Bauries, supra note 10, at 321-25 (reviewing the language of state constitutional
education clauses); WOOD, supra note 27, at 103-08 (listing the text of each state
constitution's education clause).
217 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance: A
Cautionary Note, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 37, 37 (1996) (referring to these terms as "inherently
nebulous").
218 Strauss, supra note 178, at 911-12.
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provision. 219 Providing for education (in whatever way the state
constitution is interpreted to require) must be held to be
mandatory on the state. Similarly, if an education clause states
that education must be provided for "all children," then an
interpretation that allows a state to exclude, for example, disabled
children or foreign-born children is not permitted.220 But neither
of these constraints mandates just how much education must be
provided.
With this point in mind, courts must begin their inquiries with
the text of the state constitutional education clause. The first
question that must be asked is whether an education clause's
language forecloses an interpretation that derives from the clause
individual rights to education. This is what it means for the text
to "limit[] the set of acceptable answers."221  Much semantic
variation exists among the education clauses of the fifty state
constitutions, but all education clauses either mandate or
encourage the establishment of a state education system for the
benefit of the state populace. 222 Although state education clauses
generally use the language of duty, rather than right, to set forth
their requirements or admonishments, almost none foreclose an
individual rights interpretation.223 A Hohfeldian view of the
duties established in state constitutional education clauses, for
219 See Bauries, supra note 10, at 359 (arguing that, if nothing else, education clauses
foreclose a state legislature's decision not to legislate on education).
220 Of course, the Federal Constitution would also invalidate such interpretations. See,
e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229-30 (1982) (invalidating, under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a Texas law that denied public education to the
children of undocumented immigrants); Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
343 Fed. Supp. 279, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that excluding disabled children from
public education violates the Equal Protection Clause).
221 Strauss, supra note 178, at 912.
222 Bauries, supra note 19, at 719-25 (comparing the education clauses of representative
states).
223 The one possible exception is Alabama's, which explicitly disclaims any individual
entitlement to education. See ALA. CONST. art. XJV, § 256 ("[N]othing in this Constitution
shall be construed as creating or recognizing any right to education or training at public
expense .. "). The trial court in Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Education v. Hunt
purported to declare the amendment to the Alabama Constitution that resulted in the
adoption of this language unconstitutional and reinstate the prior constitutional language,
which was mandatory and duty-based. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 147
(Ala. 1993) (trial court opinion reproduced in advisory opinion of state supreme court
recognizing a prior declaration of unconstitutionality by the same judge based on the racist
origins of the amendment, which was adopted by segregationists to circumvent Brown v.
Board of Education). As this issue was never appealed, it is unclear whether this
disclaimer language is operative.
998 [Vol. 48:949
THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
example, could support an interpretation that these duties are the
"jural correlatives" of individual claim rights.224 Thus, a judicial
interpretation of an education clause that locates within it an
individual right to education is not outside "the set of acceptable
answers" to the question of what the education clause means.
This conclusion does not mean, of course, that the individual
rights interpretation is sound. Courts in different states will come
to different conclusions on this question, no doubt. No state court
has yet conducted a thorough analysis of this question, despite
much rhetoric in the school finance cases claiming that state
residents have a "right to education." Once courts begin to directly
address the individual rights question, it is likely that, in at least
some states, courts will come to the conclusion that a true
individual right to adequate education may be derived from the
duty established in the education clause. In such states, then, how
should the content of that right be defined? The next section
addresses this question.
B. DEFINING THE RIGHT BY ENFORCING IT
Common law constitutionalism denotes an incremental,
iterative approach to the development of constitutional law. This
approach relies on "smaller," more fact-bound judgments in
individual cases, as opposed to the "settle everything at once"
decrees more common in institutional reform cases. It frees judges
to develop constitutional law in light of the facts on the ground and
the remedies that will be required to redress harms to particular
individuals. Yet, it also limits judges through the common law
constraints of tradition and convention. Due to these features, a
common law state constitutionalism may be employed to define
education rights by enforcing education rights, individual by
individual.
224 Only the Washington Supreme Court has ventured into Hohfeldian analysis thus far.
See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 247-48 (Wash. 2012) ("Flowing from this
constitutionally imposed 'duty' is its jural correlative, a correspondent 'right' permitting
control of another's conduct. Therefore, all children residing within the borders of the State
possess a 'right,' arising from the constitutionally imposed 'duty' of the State, to have the
State make ample provision for their education." (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585
P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978))). But the court did not take its correlativity analysis down to the
level of the individual student as a potential rights holder entitled to an individual remedy.
For an overview of the Hohfeldian approach, as applied to state constitutional school
finance litigation, see Bauries, supra note 10, at 306-21.
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First, the individual claim of the violation of educational
adequacy rights must be decoupled from the familiar and
universally rejected idea of the "educational malpractice" tort.225
Although federal constitutional litigation under the Due Process
Clause often is characterized as "constitutional tort" litigation, and
some state court systems have lockstepped this terminology,
common law tort duty analysis has no place in constitutional law,
even the law of constitutional torts. In federal constitutional tort
cases, the "duty" is established by the text of the Constitution and
its interpretive glosses, and a constitutional tort consists of a
federal or state official's deliberate violation of the duty.226 In
state common law tort litigation, in contrast, the question of
whether to recognize a duty is almost always a question of public
policy and the foreseeability of harm, not the adherence to an
external constitutional standard.227
State courts have universally rejected the educational
malpractice tort based on the concerns that this policy question
generates. First, deciding when a teacher has exercised
"reasonable care" in her teaching, along with whether the failure
to exercise such care is a factual and proximate cause of a failure
to learn, is likely not judicially manageable. Too many aspects of
teaching are subjective and complex, and disagreement exists
among pedagogues as to which teaching techniques are effective
and which are not.228  A good amount of teaching, some
pedagogues say, is dependent on the personality or innate talent of
a teacher.229 If this is true, then courts are correct to be concerned
225 Periodically, and usually in response to new statutory requirements or new data on
effectiveness, scholars have attempted to revive the idea of the tort of educational
malpractice, see, e.g., Ethan Hutt & Aaron Tang, The New Education Malpractice
Litigation, 99 VA. L. REV. 419, 425 (2013) (advocating a tort-based remedy for children
against school officials who negligently retain ineffective teachers), but these efforts thus
far have not dislodged the judiciary from its strong aversion to recognizing the tort.
226 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) ("Far from an abuse of power, lack of
due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable
person. To hold that injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of
law.").
227 See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty Law in
Microcosm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1890 (2011).
228 See generally PHILLIP W. JACKSON, THE PRACTICE OF TEACHING (Teachers College
1986) (reviewing some of the debates).
229 See, e.g., Stephen Rushton, Jackson Morgan & Michael Richard, Teacher's Myers-
Briggs Personality Profiles: Identifying Effective Teacher Personality Traits, 23 TEACHING &
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about determining whether an individual teacher has exercised
due care in teaching when a student's lack of educational
attainment might be related to factors having nothing to do with
the effort or care a teacher has exhibited, but may simply be a
matter of innate talent (or lack thereof). Second, even if these
matters can be the subject of judicial determination, the
establishment of a tort for which the "injury" is bad educational
attainment places responsibility for a systemic failure on one tiny
cog in the system, a seemingly arbitrary allocation of fault.230
Individual educational adequacy claims alleviate these
concerns. Educational adequacy as a state constitutional matter
does not depend on the due care of a particular teacher. The right
to an adequate education runs against the state, and to the extent
that the fulfillment of this right has been delegated, against the
school district.231 Litigants in school finance cases, accordingly, do
not focus their claims on the behavior of individual teachers, but
instead on the state legislature's or the local school district's
funding decisions. This difference in focus overcomes the judicial
manageability objection to claims against individual teachers.
Where an individual claims a violation of the right to an adequate
education, the claim will depend not on the professional behavior
of an employee not charged with the state's duty to provide an
TEACHER EDUC. 432 (2007); Jeremy A. Polk, Traits of Effective Teachers, 107 ARTS EDUC.
POL'Y REV. 23, 23 (2006). But see JAMES W. STIGLER & JAMES HIEBERT, THE TEACHING GAP:
BEST IDEAS FROM THE WORLD'S TEACHERS FOR IMPROVING EDUCATION IN THE CLASSROOM,
at xiii (Free Press 1999) (challenging this widely-stated claim).
230 Ethan Hutt and Aaron Tang recently proposed reconfiguring educational malpractice
claims with schools and school districts as defendants--basically, as negligent employment
or retention claims-and evaluating the reasonableness of a given teacher's professional
conduct based on "value-added" scores. Hutt & Tang, supra note 225, at 425-26. Leaving
aside for a moment the heated, and at present unresolved, debates regarding the usefulness
and accuracy of the value-added model of teacher evaluation, see, e.g., Preston C. Green III,
Bruce D. Baker & Joseph Oluwole, The Legal and Policy Implications of Value-Added
Teacher Assessment Policies, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, it is possible that their approach
may be reconcilable with the common-law constitutionalist method advanced here. In
particular, if the statistical models they favor prove workable, fair, and accurate, the
evidence they generate can be used in part to illustrate a state constitutional violation in a
state that favors an "input" standard. See infra notes 232-43 and accompanying text
(discussing the need for state courts to develop, through common-law reasoning, conceptions
of adequacy based on inputs, outputs, or both). Based on the many unaddressed critiques of
the validity of value-added modeling, I and many others would have real concerns were it to
form the basis of litigation based on educational outcomes.
231 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (discussing the ubiquitous practice in
state constitutions to impose educational duties on the state or the legislature).
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adequate education, but with the state (or its local government
delegate) itself. Educational adequacy is not a tort duty, but a
constitutional duty with strong fiduciary elements, and this duty
rests on the state and its appendages, not the individual
teacher.232
Still, the courts in individual adequacy cases will have to
grapple with judicial manageability. Where the state constitution
provides for an individual right to an adequate education, the
courts will have to work out just what an "adequate education"
means for an individual student. As in systemic school finance
cases, this will initially become a question of whether the
education clause mandates adequate inputs, adequate outcomes,
or some combination of the two.233 It is not the purpose of this
Article to work out the answers to these questions ex ante. Rather,
it is sufficient at this point to note that the important question of
whether a state constitution's education clause mandates adequate
resources or adequate outcomes, or some combination of the two,
will have to be resolved in individual cases, just as it has been part
of the systemic cases thus far.
However, if courts begin to address these questions in the
context of actual plaintiffs with actual individual stories to tell,
and more importantly, individual harms to be remedied, it is likely
that the courts' answers will be more realistic than those of courts
addressing the entire system's adequacy because individual claims
will inherently impose on judicial decisionmaking the constraints
of causation and remediation.
First, in an individual educational adequacy claim, the plaintiff
will bear some burden to prove causation of the alleged
constitutional harm, and the need to prove such causation will
require both the parties and the court to settle on what must be
"caused." In the current systemic reform environment, cases are
presented as "facial," as opposed to "as-applied," challenges. 234 A
232 See Bauries, supra note 19, at 705 (proposing that legislatures in constitutional
democracies owe the public fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty). Indeed, under well-
settled principles of agency law, the teacher's fiduciary duty, like the fiduciary duties of all
employees, runs to her employer, the school district. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 1.01 cmt. g, illus. 17 (2006) ("As agents, all employees owe a duty of loyalty to their
employers."); Combs v. PriceWaterhouse Coopers LLP, 382 F.3d 1196, 1200 n.2 (10th Cir.
2004) (explaining that employees, as agents, owe fiduciary duties to their employers).
233 Hutt & Tang, supra note 225, at 443.
234 William E. Thro, School Finance Litigation as Facial Challenges, 272 EDUC. L. REP.
687, 688 (2011).
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facial challenge to a statute's constitutionality does not require
any proof of causation of harm because the statute itself shows the
constitutional harm on its face.235 However, educational adequacy
claims challenge political prioritization and appropriations
decisions, each of which may have been incidentally helpful to
some, incidentally harmful to others, and benign to still others.
For example, it would be highly implausible (but certainly not
impossible) to claim, in a systemic education finance adequacy
suit, that all of a state's students have been deprived of the
adequate educational opportunities to which they are entitled.
But where a claim alleges that insufficient resources have been
provided for the education system, this is exactly the claim made.
Individual claims of educational inadequacy, in contrast, will be
in the nature of "as-applied" challenges-indeed, they could not
proceed in any other way, as there is no way to examine a school
funding statute's face and understand whether a particular
individual student receives an adequate education through it.
Thus, individual adequacy cases will require that a causal link be
drawn between the state of education for the individual in
question and state or local funding decisions because these claims
will depend on the fact of inadequate educational resources or
outcomes for each individual claimant.
In systemic education finance litigation, courts seem to have
assumed that lack of money ipso facto causes inadequacy of
educational outcomes or opportunities, and that state legislative
schemes are ipso facto the reason for all inadequacies in local
resources. 236 Because of these two tacit assumptions, the courts
have not had to do the hard work of deciding whether the
constitution mandates inputs or outputs, but instead have often
conflated the two. 237 A causation requirement would put the
235 Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1238
(2010).
236 See Alfred A. Lindseth, The Legal Backdrop to Adequacy, in COURTING FAILURE: How
SCHOOL FINANCE LAWSUITS EXPLOIT JUDGES' GOOD INTENTIONS AND HARM OUR CHILDREN
60-61 (Eric A. Hanushek ed., 2006) (describing the disappearance of causation as a legal
element of education adequacy claims); R. Craig Wood & David C. Thompson, Politics of
Plaintiffs and Defendants, in MONEY, POLITICS, AND LAW: INTERSECTIONS AND CONFLICTS IN
THE PROVISION OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 44 (Karen DeMoss & Kenneth K. Wong eds.,
2004) (stating, in education finance adequacy suits, "Generally, it is unclear how the state
aid distributional formula led to the failure of these children to achieve.").
237 Cf. James Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Reform, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223,
1226 (2008).
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question front and center. Individual litigation would inevitably
impose such a causation requirement, as individual claims do in
other areas of constitutional law having to do with resource
allocation.238
One way in which courts may choose to address such a
causation requirement is through burden shifting. If it is a simple
lack of resources that must be "caused," then a burden-shifting
causation battle will likely involve the state attempting to
convince the court that local mismanagement of funds caused
resources to be inadequate, while the district attempts to convince
the court instead that the funding provided by the state was
inadequate to secure appropriate resources even in a world of
perfect fiscal management. If what must be "caused" is a bad
educational outcome, then the battle will involve the state
attempting to show that factors other than a lack of resources
caused the individual student not to achieve.
For instance, an individual plaintiff who proves that he or she
attended an accredited public educational institution and was not
a habitual truant, but failed to achieve an adequate education,
might be presumed to have been denied the necessary resources
that would have enabled such achievement. The state might then
rebut this presumption with proof that it provided the necessary
resources, perhaps by producing evidence of comparator students
of similar ability in the same school district who did achieve at
desired levels. Through the litigation of several cases in this way,
238 See Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563,
603 (2001) ("A court would be hard-pressed to find that the enrollment patterns were
caused by the centric nature of the school, and without causation there is no constitutional
claim."); Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828, 858
(1983) ("All claims of unconstitutional discrimination require findings of both a
discriminatory purpose and a causal connection between the discriminatory action and the
alleged injury."); cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) ("[W]e hold that a
finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school
system, as in this case, creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the
system is not adventitious. It establishes, in other words, a prima facie case of unlawful
segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the
burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of
intentionally segregative actions."); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1,
23 (1971) ("Our objective in dealing with the issues presented by these cases is to see that
school authorities exclude no pupil of a racial minority from any school, directly or
indirectly, on account of race; it does not and cannot embrace all the problems of racial
prejudice, even when those problems contribute to disproportionate racial concentrations in
some schools.").
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a state's courts will gradually settle on facts that indicate
abridgment and fulfillment of the education right 23
9
Second, individual claims would call for individual remediation.
For example, if a court finds that, by virtue of state action or
inaction, a student-plaintiff has not been provided the opportunity
to access high school mathematics instruction that meets the
adequacy standard, then the court can remedy this deprivation by
ordering the state to waive tuition for the student's remedial
community college studies in mathematics. If the plaintiff is
younger, the same principle can apply to tutoring, after-school
programs, and other specific instructional measures. In the
extreme case, even private school reimbursement could be ordered,
as it is in extreme situations under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).240
Importantly, these types of remedies could never succumb to
the familiar criticism of "judicial legislation," as they would be
tailored specifically to compensate the individual litigant who
brought the case and whose rights were found to be individually
violated. Remedies might include additional instruction, changes
in classroom settings, and other individual accommodations
(perhaps even the "voucher remedy" that has thus far eluded
plaintiffs),241 but the courts will have to ask, as to each proposed
remedy, whether it deserves to be part of the fabric of the state's
constitutional rights jurisprudence, keeping in mind the natural
operation of remedial equilibration.
239 Derek Black has made a forceful argument identifying problems with causation as the
primary driver of judicial reticence in equal protection jurisprudence having to do with
schools and its remedies. Derek Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to be
Learned, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1723, 1757-67 (2012). The approach suggested here, which
depends inherently on the claims being transformed from systemic claims to individual
claims, attempts to address Professor Black's concerns, but the approach suggested here
also, admittedly, leaves the systemic causation problem for another day.
240 See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009) (holding that a public school
may be required to reimburse parents of a disabled child whose educational placement was
inadequate to meet the child's needs, where the parents unilaterally placed the child in a
private school). Although the IDEA is a statute, and therefore affords sub-constitutional
rights, its guarantee of a "free and appropriate public education" is somewhat similar to
that which is required in most state constitutional education clauses. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(9) (2012) (defining a "free and appropriate public education"). For an argument that
educational adequacy claims should be modeled on the procedures for securing rights under
the IDEA, see Elder, supra note 118, at 137.
241 See, e.g., Greg D. Andres, Private School Voucher Remedies in Education Cases, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 795 (1995) (discussing the remedy of vouchers in school finance cases under
state constitutions).
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Regardless of whether state courts adopt burden shifting or
some other method of proof, and regardless of the individual
remedies chosen to remediate proven harms, the courts will have
to come to terms with the effects of such judicially derived or
adopted standards on individual students and on future claims.
Courts currently are detached from this inquiry by virtue of their
systemic focus, and this detachment leads them to make broad
pronouncements of what the education system should provide or
achieve statewide, stating goals that are often inherently
impossible to achieve, 242 or that give short shrift to local realities.
More focused attention on the individuals and the remedies to
which they are entitled-missing from the current system-focused
judicial approaches-would have the salutary effect of causing
courts that derive standards of educational adequacy to consider
whether such standards are realistic as a constitutional "floor," or
whether they set an unreasonable or aspirational set of goals.243
In time, the constraint of tradition, in the form of the rules of
precedent, will allow the law of educational adequacy to settle on
results that provide relief without unrealistically burdening the
system, and most importantly, without requiring courts to assume
a legislative posture.
V. COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM CAVEATS
So far, this Article has made the case that incremental, common
law constitutional adjudication is a more constitutionally sound
way to develop meaning for the vague terms of education clauses
than broad, systemic pronouncements. Below, this Article posits
that an incrementalist approach may also be a better way to foster
systemic reform than systemic institutional reform litigation. But
first, it is necessary to address some considerations that apply to
the use of common law constitutionalism as an alternative to
systemic institutional reform litigation.
242 See, e.g., William E. Thro, A New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School
Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 525, 548 (1998) (writing of the Kentucky Supreme
Court's decision in Rose, stating, "If [the Kentucky] standard is taken literally, there is not
a public school system in America that meets it."). The Kentucky formulation has been
cited or adopted in numerous other cases, most of which resulted in declaratory judgments
against the state.
243 There is evidence that courts concocting their own standards of education adequacy do
not consider whether they are realistic. Id.
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A. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND COURTS CHECKING COURTS
A forceful objection exists to the effect that common law
constitutionalism, like the common law itself, is no less vulnerable
to judicial activism or overreach than systemic adjudication.
Considered in light of the additional fact that individual
adjudication is less publicly "visible" than systemic adjudication, it
is necessary to also recognize that, to be successful, common law
constitutionalism requires a certain vigilance. If interpretations of
constitutional text are to be arrived at incrementally, and through
small constitutional moves, then later courts-and especially lower
courts-must respect the main pillar of strength holding up the
common law method-the rules of precedent.244 Strauss describes
the rules of precedent as part of the constraint of tradition, which
calls on courts to respect what has been subjected to analysis and
has been the subject of agreement, or at least compromise, in the
past.245  Strauss does not directly address the specifics of the
traditional constraint of precedent, but implicit in his argument is
that courts following a common law constitutionalist methodology
must observe the distinction between holding and dicta.246
After digesting the discussion above, this conclusion should be
somewhat obvious. An incrementalist judicial method can quickly
be converted to a maximalist legislative method if decision-issuing
judges and justices feel empowered to make binding
pronouncements that go beyond the facts of the cases they decide.
This power can only come from later and lower courts crediting
unnecessarily broad rulings as holdings and adhering to such
pronouncements unreflectively as "settled law." One goal of the
common law methodology is for constitutional interpretation to
occur with greater finality and frequency in the lower courts,
where it is most insulated from the political pressures of Supreme
Court (and especially state supreme court) practice, and where it
244 See, e.g., Patricio A. Fernandez & Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto, Stare Decisis: Rhetoric and
Substance, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 328 (2010) (demonstrating that the rules of precedent
make the common law both more stable and more flexible).
245 Strauss, supra note 178, at 908.
246 See, e.g., Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 219, 220-21 (2010) (arguing that faulty attention to judicial statements--
what courts say-as opposed to actual holdings-what courts do, leads to the elevation of
dicta to binding precedent); Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57
STAN. L. REV. 953, 953 (2005) (developing a new test for determining the actual holding of a
case and applying the test to several familiar constitutional law cases).
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is most focused on the rights of specific individuals. But such
finality demands judicial adherence to the responsibility to resolve
the issues in the instant case, not the hypothetical next case.
Adhering to the rules of precedent-the main one being the
distinction between holding and dicta-will foster this lower-court
constitutionalism.
An incrementalist approach depends on judicial humility and
restraint. Allowing for legislative holdings to become binding
precedent destroys the features of the common law method and
reinstates the chief problem of systemic adjudication today-the
tendency of state courts to essentially amend the state constitution
in broad strokes through declaratory judgments that require
nothing, but please and aggrandize court-watchers and activists
much, and accordingly cause the courts to "pay no price" and take
no risk for their alterations of the status quo.247 If common law
state constitutionalism is to succeed, and if lower courts are to do
the bulk of constitutional interpretation case by case, then the
rules of precedent must be observed.
B. THE LITIGATION FLOOD
A possible advantage of the systemic institutional reform
approach is that it ostensibly resolves a constitutional issue
statewide in one decision, thus preventing courts from being
flooded with individual claims. This advantage would be quite
persuasive were it true that systemic cases bring relief to
individual rights holders, but as the discussion above shows, this
is not the case. Nevertheless, a broader objection might be made
to the manageability of the many cases that may be brought in a
state's courts if the courts are to recognize an enforceable,
individually remediable right to adequate education. Given the
state of education in the United States, it is easy to imagine the
long line of plaintiffs that will form once a state supreme court
recognizes an enforceable individual right to education. In short,
there may be a "flood of litigation," as courts often fear.
In answer to this objection, it is worth asking whether all floods
are bad simply because they are floods, or whether only certain
247 See Pierre N. Leval, Judging under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1249, 1263 (2006) (describing one of the problems with dicta as being that, in uttering
dicta, the court "pays no price," and therefore is less likely to be careful in its reasoning).
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kinds of floods are worthy of our concern. In the words of Prosser
and Keeton, speaking of fears that recognizing the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress will flood the courts
with claims:
But this is a poor reason for denying recovery for any
genuine, serious mental injury. It is the business of
the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the
expense of a "flood of litigation," and it is a pitiful
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of
justice to deny relief on such grounds. That a
multiplicity of actions may follow is not a persuasive
objection; if injuries are multiplied, actions should be
multiplied, so injured persons may have
recompense.248
Particularly in constitutional law, it is nonsensical to deny
plaintiffs access to the courts on the basis that government has
acted broadly to deprive people of their rights. Simply put, some
floods are not destructive, but necessary and beneficial, in the
same way that the yearly floods of the Nile River are necessary to
fertilize the soil.
Remedial equilibration theory also provides a response to this
objection. The requirement that courts adjudicate the rights of
many individuals and remediate violations of those rights with
individually tailored remedies will itself tamp down on judicial
adventurism in defining the rights themselves. 249 Over time,
realism will replace aspiration and political pandering in defining
the minimum requirements of an adequate education as the
pressures of remediation filter back to place constraints on the
expansion of the content of the rights. This process of constraint
and equilibrium will provide state legislatures the space they need
to engage the legislative process outside the supervision of the
courts. If judicial interpretations become more tethered to both
text and fiscal reality, and state legislatures begin to embrace
248 PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E.
Keeton & David G. Owen eds., 5th ed. 1984).
249 See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency of state judiciaries
to over-define education clause terms due to the lack of remedial constraints inherent in
declaratory judgment practices in constitutional law).
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their own duties to implement state constitutional requirements
with due care and in good faith, 2 0 then an initial "flood" of claims
may prove salutary.
C. COMPARED TO WHAT?
The most basic of all evaluative public policy questions is
"Compared to what?" Social scientists generally lodge this
question as a challenge to any claim that a particular policy
solution works, and it puts the promoter of the solution to his
proof, so to speak, in requiring the promoter to justify the proposed
solution as one that actually improves upon the status quo. This
Article has, to this point, justified common law constitutionalism
on theoretical and operational grounds against the comparator of
systemic adjudication. What remains is to justify the common law
constitutionalist approach to the interpretation of education rights
on the grounds of its potential to achieve the kind of systemic
reform that systemic institutional reform litigation seeks. The
next Part addresses this question.
VI. INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS AND SYSTEMIC EDUCATION REFORM
Systemic institutional reform litigation aimed at improving the
quality of educational systems in the states has had, at best, a
mixed record of success. While it is certainly true that plaintiffs
have won judgments against states on their claims of educational
inadequacy, evidence is scant and conflicting as to actual
improvements in the education systems of states in which
plaintiffs have achieved these victories. Observers from both the
legal and public policy communities have documented this mixed
record in terms of educational expenditures and outcomes. 251 In
250 See Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging,
101 CAL. L. REV. 699, 731 (2013) (outlining the duties of judges as fiduciaries of the people).
251 See, e.g., ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND
STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS
143-70 (2009) (making the case that school finance litigation has not been successful); Elder,
supra note 118, at 142-43 (documenting similar expenditure increases and decreases in both
states where plaintiffs won victories in adequacy suits and states where plaintiffs lost their
cases). But see Michael A. Rebell & Bruce D. Baker, Assessing 'Success' in School Finance
Litigations, EDUC. WK. (July 8, 2009), http://www.edweek.orgtew/articles/2009/07/O8/36rebell.
h28.html?qs=Assessing+Success+in+School+Finance+Litigation (questioning Hanushek's and
Lindseth's methodology, and documenting positive results from targeted expenditure
increases in New Jersey).
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addition to the disputes over its success, systemic educational
reform litigation has often led to intractable conflicts between
state legislatures and state courts. Where these battles are joined,
the courts typically retreat,252 the individual judges suffer political
defeat, 253 or the values they protect through their decisions suffer
a similar political fate.254 Courts cannot win these head-to-head
battles with legislatures, but systemic litigation makes such
confrontations inevitable.
In the area of positive constitutional entitlements, courts are on
their best institutional footing where they seek to signal to the
legislature that individual rights are being violated, putting the
legislature on notice of the potential for further judgments and the
need for reform, while refraining from directing the legislative
product.255 Such signaling shares space with arguments for tort
252 See, e.g., Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12 v. State, 958 A.2d 930, 932-33 (N.H. 2008)
(dismissing the latest appeal in the ongoing Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor litigation, on
the assumption that the state legislature has tried to address the unconstitutionality of the
state education system in "good faith"); State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 202-03
(Ohio 2003) (releasing jurisdiction of the ongoing DeRolph v. State litigation, while
continuing to hold that the state education system is unconstitutional).
253 See, e.g., Bronson D. Bills, A Penny for the Court's Thoughts? The High Price of
Judicial Elections, 3 NW. J.L. & Soc. PoL'Y 29, 31-32 (2008) (detailing the ouster of one of
the justices who concurred in Guinn v. Legislature, 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003), overruled in
part by Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339, 348 (Nev. 2006), in which the Nevada
Supreme Court ordered the state legislature to ignore a recently imposed supermajority
requirement in the state constitution in favor of the substantive requirement to fund the
state's schools).
254 See Joseph T. Henke, Financing Public Schools in California: The Aftermath of
Serrano v. Priest and Proposition 13, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 22-23, 22 n.87 (1986) (reviewing
the legislative response to Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano I1),
specifically A.B. 65 (1977), the bill designed to implement the courts' orders). Proposition
13 sharply limited the California state and local governments' ability to raise taxes for
school funding. See Bauries, supra note 209, at 22-27 (detailing the Serrano litigation and
its legislative and popular constitutional amendment aftermath).
255 See, e.g., David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J.
723, 774 (2009) (explaining that courts help to remedy an information asymmetry between
the public and the legislature by providing recognizable, authoritative, and public signals as
to whether the legislature has acted unconstitutionally and if so, to what extent the people
should be alarmed about it); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on
Terror," 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1049-59 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court's
signaling, through procedural rulings, its view of substantive questions); id. at 1071
(documenting Congress's substantive and prophylactic response to one such signal sent by
the Court through its procedural rulings in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006));
Philip C. Kissam, Alexis de Tocqueville and American Constitutional Law: On Democracy,
the Majority Will, Individual Rights, Federalism, Religion, Civic Associations, and
Originalist Constitutional Theory, 59 ME. L. REV. 35, 63 (2007) (describing the Court's
decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) as a "federalism signal to Congress");
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law grounded in the deterrence rationale. 256 Theorists defending a
deterrence-based model of tort law in both small and large-scale
litigation have shown that judgments in favor of plaintiff lead to
positive changes in organizational risk management and legal
compliance. 257  Direct injunctive orders from courts to the
organizations at issue are not required for these positive changes
to occur. Rather, organizational self-interest promotes good
behavior in response to judgments.258
An example of this signaling in another context is the Florida
federal court case of Debra P. v. Turlington.259 The plaintiff in
Debra P. challenged the denial of her high school diploma based on
her failing score on the SSAT II, an early high-stakes graduation
test of basic skills.260 She contended that her poor performance on
the test was traceable to her having spent the majority of her
schooling years in the segregated (and vastly under-resourced)
schools for black children in Hillsborough County, which had then
only recently been desegregated by court order. 261
The plaintiff initially won an injunctive moratorium on the use
of the test after the district was unable to prove that the content
Comment, What Lies Ahead for ERISA's Preemption Doctrine after a Judicial Call to Action
is Issued in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 43 HouS. L. REV. 150 (2006) (speaking of the
Court's decision finding ERISA preemption over a sympathetic state-law claim in Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), "Although this 'dialogic function' between the
judiciary and Congress is present to some degree in every Court decision, it is most
apparent in Davila because the Court's ruling sent a message to Congress that the Court's
hands are tied, leaving it up to Congress to fix the problem."); Levinson, supra note 78, at
906-07, 906 n.203 (discussing "the expressive or signaling function of constitutional
decisions" as a means to alter congressional behavior in the procedures that it follows in
enacting statutes); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity
"Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV. 121-22 (1996) (speculating that a dubious limitation placed
on congressional power and grounded in state sovereignty would operate as a symbol,
causing Congress to take special care to protect state sovereignty when enacting future
legislation, and that this limitation could consequently "work as a catalyst for political and
social change"). Professor Bobbitt's well-known concept of the "cueing function" of Supreme
Court decisionmaking is akin to the idea of constitutional signaling. See Phillip K. Bobbitt,
Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695, 757 (1980).
256 See, e.g., Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 199 (2012).
257 See Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (In Hospitals,
a Large Retailer, and Jails and Prisons, 2 J. TORT L. 1, 2 (2008).
258 See id. at 4.
259 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979), affd in part, vacated in part, 664 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.
1981).
260 See id. at 246-47 (placing an injunctive moratorium on the use of Florida's high-stakes
graduation test, pending the state's demonstration of its curricular validity).
261 Id. at 246, 251 n.12.
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tested on the SSAT II was actually taught in the segregated
schools that she had attended. After the court initially enjoined
the use of the test, the state engaged in a comprehensive
curriculum audit, and the court later responded to the state's audit
by declining to apply the injunction to students who never
attended de jure segregated schools. 262 However, state officials
saw in the initial decision the potential for future such judgments
and, in response, the state reformed testing and curriculum
alignment throughout the state. 263
Since shortly after the 1984 decision in favor of the state, each
district in Florida has been mandated to map its curriculum to
state standards every year.264 No court ever ordered this action
prospectively for the entire state. Rather, the state officials likely
saw the judicial results of its prior lack of prudent action in
documenting curricular coverage in one case, and concluded
(wisely) that it would be better to document that alignment of
statewide curriculum to statewide exams than to fight the same
evidentiary battle in every future case related to graduation
testing. Thus, an initial victory on behalf of an individual plaintiff
and a few others similarly situated caused the state for the first
time to really examine and evaluate the alignment between what
was taught and what was tested on state exams-a good practice
by anyone's estimation-and the effects of the decision still drive
educational practices in Florida today.
262 See Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405, 1416 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirming the district
court's dissolution of the injunction after the state established, based on a curriculum audit,
that the content of the graduation test was now being taught in Florida's schools).
263 See Florida Department of Education, Office of Assessment, History of Statewide
Assessment Program: A Chronology of Events: 1978-1989, at 8, available at http://www.
fldoe.org/asp/hsap/hsap7889.asp (last visited June 6, 2014) (outlining the extensive
curricular and testing reform activities undertaken in response to the 1979 and 1984
rulings in the Debra P. litigation, which included ongoing validation of test items,
alignment of curriculum and instruction, and legislative action in directing the development
of the Florida "Standards of Excellence," the progenitor of the Florida "Sunshine State
Standards," the current curriculum guide to Florida schooling).
MA See FLA. STAT. § 1003.42 (2013) ("Each district school board shall provide all courses
required for middle grades promotion, high school graduation, and appropriate instruction
designed to ensure that students meet State Board of Education adopted standards in the
following subject areas: reading and other language arts, mathematics, science, social
studies, foreign languages, health and physical education, and the arts."); FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. r. 6A-1.09401 (2011) (mandating the use of the "Next Generation Sunshine
State Standards" as the basis for assessment and curriculum for all school districts in the
state).
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The Debra P. decision signaled to both the Florida Legislature
and Department of Education the need to make curricular and
instructional changes statewide to ensure that any student denied
a diploma for failure to pass the state's exit exam had a
demonstrable opportunity to learn the material tested on it. Debra
P. therefore illustrates how the constitutional signaling function of
judicial decisions tailored to individuals and classes of individuals
can cause systemic reform without mandating it.265 This signaling
function allows legislative actors to respond to judicial orders
tailored to individuals by voluntarily changing systemic elements
likely to lead to future litigation and judgments. In this way, the
signaling function avoids the inevitable separation of powers
problems that result from the prospect of judges directing the
legislature to make broad, systemic policy changes. Indeed,
separation-of-powers never came up at all in the Debra P. cases,
and this is not surprising, since the court's orders never were
directed at any coordinate branch of government.
Of course, Debra P. was a case about negative rights arising out
of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the positive entitlements that
state constitutional education clauses provide, so a skeptic might
view the effects of that case as not transferrable to the positive
entitlement context. Experience over the past thirty-five years
under the IDEA266 addresses this concern. As commentators have
pointed out, the leverage achieved by a few thousand lawsuits and
administrative due process proceedings in changing special
education practices nationwide for over 6,000,000 disabled
children served by the system each year is truly remarkable. 267
Simply put, the realistic prospect of being sued successfully and
being required to remedy individual deprivations of the "free and
appropriate public education" that the IDEA requires causes local
265 See Law, supra note 255, at 755 ("[A] misbehaving government faces a loss of political
support if its conduct is identified and publicized by a court armed with little more than a
reputation for competence and integrity.").
26 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012).
267 See, e.g., Elder, supra note 118, at 157 ("Even though there have been thousands of
lawsuits filed under the IDEA over the past several decades, the fact that millions of
children have been helped by the law indicates that it effectively leveraged the threat of
litigation to ensure that every child's rights are upheld." (footnotes omitted)); see also Mark
C. Weber, Litigation Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act After
Buckhannon Board & Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 357, 360 (2004) (relating that, in a recent year, "about I1,000'
due process hearings were held).
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school districts, and sometimes state governments, to act to
improve the system on their own.
The same would likely be true of individual adequacy suits. By
focusing on the individual deprivation of an entitlement, a court
can give both local district and statewide policymakers important
signals concerning what is and is not adequate education. In
deciding an individual case and ordering remediation of any
harms, a court can therefore both afford relief to the individual
actually harmed without treading into the legislative territory of
making policy for the state itself, and by doing so, also signal to
the coordinate branches at the level of state policymaking that
changes to the system might be a better path than continued
individual litigation and remediation. Because the judicial
remedies would be directed at adjudicating the rights of the
harmed individuals and compensating only for identified violations
to these individuals' rights, there would be no danger of judicial
policymaking or invasion of the legislative province. Eventually,
systemic reform would occur without any direct confrontations
between the state legislature and the state judiciary, without any
remedial orders to exercise the power of the purse in a particular
way, and likely without the same cases coming back to the courts
again and again due to legislative recalcitrance. 268
Returning to the "litigation flood" critique, in light of this
signaling function of judicial decisions, it is easy to see how
beneficial an initial litigation flood may be. A state legislature,
recognizing a flood of individual claims in a neighboring state, or
the first signs of an impending flood in its own, would be more
likely to legislate proactively. For example, some commentators
have advocated addressing school finance failures through a
claims system similar to that under the IDEA,269 which was
enacted in response to two seminal equal protection decisions
268 See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995) (declining to review
an adequacy claim, citing the "decades-long struggle" of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
addressing one school finance case that has been the subject of no less than twenty-one high
court opinions, each of which admonishes the legislature for some level of non-compliance);
see also supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text (discussing the New Jersey saga).
269 William Koski and Sonja Elder have advocated versions of such a system in large-scale
systemic reform cases. See William S. Koski, Achieving "Adequacy" in the Classroom, 27
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13 (2007); Elder, supra note 118, at 157-59 (advocating for the use
of the IDEA due process proceeding as a model for individual school finance claims). The
approach outlined in this Article makes that goal much more attainable.
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favoring disabled students in the early 1970s,270 or those under the
workers' compensation systems that exist in every state, most of
which were initially enacted in part due to worries over a coming
litigation flood as courts began to chip away at the "fellow servant"
doctrine in employment tort cases.27 1  Similar to these other
administrative models, a claims system as an alternative to
litigation not only could be an effective way to enforce individual
rights to education, but also could be a way of reforming state
education systems retail, rather than wholesale.
The adoption of a claims system has thus far eluded state
legislatures in the context of rights to adequate education, even
though it is common knowledge that thousands of children
nationwide do without adequate education every year.272 But an
initial litigation flood, predicated by judicial recognition and
enforcement of an individual right to adequate education, might be
exactly what is needed to enable such adoption. Importantly,
however, whether to adopt such a claims system, reform the
education system wholesale, or address the cases in court as they
arise should be at the discretion of the state legislature. If courts
stick to adjudicating individual claims rather than issuing broad
declarations and systemic injunctions, such adoption would occur
on the legislature's terms, not the court's.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article takes no position on whether it would be
normatively or interpretively correct for any particular state to
interpret its own state constitution's education clause to provide
for individual rights. That question must be addressed state by
state as each case presents it, and evaluated based on the text,
history, and structure of each state's constitution. Rather, the
point of this Article has been to show that no state has enforced
270 See generally Martin et al., supra note 5, at 28-29 (discussing the adoption of state
disability education statutes and the federal statute that became the IDEA in response to
Pa. Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) and Mills
v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972)).
271 See generally John Fabian Witt, Note, The Transformation of Work and the Law of
Workplace Accidents, 1842-1910, 107 YALE L.J. 1467 (1998) (reviewing the background and
history of workers' compensation legislation).
272 See generally Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE
L.J. 330 (2006) (noting prevalent educational inequality and its disparate impact among
poor and minority students).
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such an interpretation, that this is due to path dependence on
federal systemic institutional reform litigation as a paradigm, and
that another approach is possible.
It may be that courts in most states, once they consider the
implications of an individual right to adequate education, will
reject such an interpretation. It may also be that a few states will
adopt such an interpretation and later find it unworkable. If so,
perhaps educational adequacy litigation will revert back to the
systemic variety, or perhaps it will disappear into the political
process. But this Article has provided a theoretical and
operational grounding on which state courts may, for the first
time, actually consider and resolve the question of whether
education is actually a positive individual constitutional right.
We should bring the litigation of rights to education out of the
shadow of federal institutional reform litigation and refocus it on
the individual rights holders under each state's constitution. By
doing so, we can diffuse most-perhaps all-of the intractable
inter-branch conflicts that the current style of school finance
adequacy litigation creates. We likely can also achieve more
certain and more stable systemic reform over time. Most
importantly, though, by focusing litigation of education rights on
those who actually possess those rights, we will, for the first time
in education clause litigation, have the ability to link these rights
with individual remedies. A common law constitutionalism is the
key to making this shift, and to making the right to education a
reality.
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